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INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court has developed a
Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") jurisprudence that has become increasingly preemptive of state efforts to regulate arbitration. 1 During
this same period, however, state legislatures and courts have forcefully sought in a vast array of contexts to regulate and, indeed, to
invalidate arbitration agreements that the legislatures or the courts
have perceived as threatening the interests of the state, its businesses, its consumers, or its workers. 2 Much of this state arbitration
legislation and case law is curious in that it was so evidently preempted at its inception under the U.S. Supreme Court's then existing
FAAjurisprudence, 3 Indeed, Professor Sarah Rudolph Cole has speculated that states may be enacting arbitration legislation that is
seemingly preempted by the FAA as a "purely symbolic" gesture or in
1. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy, Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion, and the Future of American Arbitration, 22 AM. REv.

lNT'L Ann. 323, 325-26 (2011) (commenting that the Supreme Court's most recent
arbitration jurisprudence "reflect[s] the increasingly extreme pro-arbitration slant of
recent decades" and "vastly expands the po,ver of companies to impose and control

arbitration procedures while tying the hands of state legislatures and courts").
2. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: "One Size Fits All" Does
Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Dlsp, RESOL, 759, 785-87 (2001) (discussing various state
statutes that purport to protect certain categories of disputants from compliance with
predispute arbitration agreements); Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d
250, 278, 292 (W, Va. 2011) (criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court for its "tendentious
reasoning" in expansively interpreting the FAA and holding that "as a matter of public policy under West Virginia law, an arbitration clause in a nursing home admission

agreement adopted prior to an occurrence of negligence that results in a personal
injury or wrongful death, shall not be enforced to compel arbitration of a dispute concerning the negligence"), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (2012).
3. See, e.g., Marmet Health Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1202--03 (2012)
(per curiam opinion rebuking the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia for "misreading and disregarding the precedents of [the U.S. Supreme Court] interpreting the
FAA" and noting that "[t)he West Virginia court's interpretation of the FAA was both
incorrect and inconsistent with clear instruction in the precedents of [the] Court");
Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 501, 503, 504 (2012) (per curiam
opinion chastising the Oklahoma Supreme Court for "ignor[ing) a basic tenet of the
[Federal Arbitration) Act's substantive arbitration law," namely the Prima Paint doctrine, and adding for good measure that "[t)here is no general-specific exception to the
Supremacy Clause"); Cole, supra note 2, at 786, 789 (labeling various state legislation
disfavoring arbitration agreements relating to certain categories of disputes "interest-

ing in light of the fact that the FAA likely preempts any categorical exclusions from a
state uniform arbitration ac~'); Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration
and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEx. INT'L L.J. 449, 452 n.11 (2005) (widely-published
arbitration scholar stating that he "can't even begin to understand the California Supreme Court's decision in Broughton u. Cigna Healthplans of California" which held
that claims for public injunctive relief under California's Consumer Legal Remeclies
Act are not subject to arbitration).
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the hope that such legislation might spur Congress to amend the
FAA to allow states greater leeway to regulate arbitration. 4 Then
again, state legislatures and courts might simply perceive that the
need for certain arbitration regulation is so great that it is best to
proceed with arguably preempted regulation until the U.S. Supreme
Court rules that the FAA preempts the specific state effort at issue. 5
Employment arbitration has long been a favorite target of these
state legislative and judicial efforts. 6 California law provides the
prime example. 7 California's legislature and courts have been among
the most aggressive in seeking to limit arbitration.a Thus, it is likely
more than coincidence that a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court's
4. Cole, supra note 2, at 789.
5. See, e.g., Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 940 (Mont. 1994), rev'd, 517
U.S. 681 (1996) (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring) (castigating the federal judiciary
for an arbitration jurisprudence characterized by a "type of arrogance [that] not only
reflects an intellectual detachment from reality, but [also] a self-serving disregard for
the purposes for which courts exist"); Truly Nolan of Arn. v. Superior Court, 208 145
Cal. Rptr. 3d 432, 434 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (stating in dicta that, "Although Concepcion's reasoning strongly suggests that Gentry's holding is preempted by federal law,
the United States Supreme Court did not directly rule on the class arbitration issue in
the context of unwaivable statutory rights and the California Supreme Court has not
yet revisited Gentry [and t]hus, we continue to be bound by Gentry under California's
stare decisis principles"); Kinecta Alternative Fin. Solutions, Inc. v. Superior Court,

140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 347, 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (stating in dicta that "[a] question
exists about whether Gentry survived the overruling of Discover Bank in Concepcion,"
but 11 [s]ince it has not been expressly abrogated or overruled, Gentry appears to re-

main the binding law in California").
6. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 2, at 786 (noting that "[alt least twelve states have
specifically exempted non-union employer-employee disputes from coverage of that
state's arbitration act"); Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., LLC., 273 P.3d 20, 27 (Okla.
2011) (holding "tbat the existence of an arbitration agreement in an employment contract does not prohibit judicial review of the underlying agreement"), vacated, 133 S.
Ct. 500 (2012).
7. See, e.g., infra notes 79-193 and accompanying text (discussing California's
four principal employment arbitration doctrines).
8. See, e.g., Broughton v Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999)
(holding that claims for public injunctive relief under the California Consumer Legal
Remedies Act designed to protect the public from deceptive business practices are not
subject to arbitration); Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal. 2003)
(extending Broughton's holding to include claims to enjoin unfair competition under
California's Unfair Competition Law and claims to enjoin false advertising under California Business and Professions Code section 17500); Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Application of the Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts
Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 39, 41 (2006)
(concluding that "California courts are clearly biased against arbitration" and "[t]heir
disdain manifests in unique unconscionability requirements applicable solely when
arbitration agreements are at issue and in lower standards for demonstrating uncon-

scionability in the arbitration context"); Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 353 (noting that
California courts "have been considerably more energetic" than other state courts in

utilizing unconscionability doctrine to deny enforcement of arbitration agreements).
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landmark FAA preemption cases have arisen in the context of challenges to California statutory or case law. 9 Two of these landmark
cases involved successful challenges to California regulation of arbitration in the context of the employment relationship. 1 0
Nonetheless, especially in the context of employment arbitration
agreements, the California courts have remained undeterred by the
mere Supremacy Clause in their efforts to protect the public interest
and the interests of workers. Specifically, they have prohibited whole
categories of employment claims from arbitration imposed by the employer as a condition of employment. Indeed, in a jurisprudence that
has been characterized by its creativity if not willful blindness to U.S.
Supreme Court precedents, the California Supreme Court has created a series of four employment arbitration doctrines each of which
from its inception has been of dubious validity from a preemption
standpoint: 11 each of these doctrines is grounded on the "effective
vindication of unwaivable state statutory rights exception" to FAA
preemption (hereinafter state effective-vindication exception) - an
arbitration branch of public policy doctrine that has never enjoyed
firm support in the U.S. Supreme Court's FAAjurisprudence.12
States aside from California also have long used public policy
and the state effective-vindication exception as justification for regulating employment arbitration. 13 Yet no other state has done so to the
9. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (holding
that the FAA preempts California's judicially-created "Discover Bank" rule classifying
as unconscionable most consumer contract collective-arbitration waivers); Preston v.

Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008) (holding that the FAA preempts the section of the
California Talent Agencies Act vesting in the California Labor Con1missioner "exclusive original jurisdiction" over claims arising under the act); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v.

Leland Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 470, 479 (1989) (holding that the FAA does not
preempt a provision of the California Arbitration Act allowing a court to stay arbitration pending resolution of related litigation if the parties have agreed that the provision shall govern their arbitration); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987)
(holding that the FAA preempts the section of the California Labor Code providing
that an action to collect wages may proceed notwithstanding an agreement to arbitrate); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (holding that the FAA
preempts the section of the California Franchise Investment Law requiring judicial
consideration of claims brought under the California statute).
10. See Preston, 552 U.S. at 354 (challenge to California regulation of those "who
engage{] in the occupation of procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure

employment or engagements for an artist or artists"); Perry, 482 U.S. at 483 (challenge to California Labor Code provision regarding wage disputes).
11. See infra notes 79-193 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 62--08 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Machado v. System4 LLC, 989 N.E.2d 464, 470 (Mass. 2013) (extending public-policy-based state effective-vindication exception to arbitration agreement as related to claims by employees under the Massachusetts Wage Act); Warfield
v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., Inc., 910 N.E.2d 317, 325, 326 n.16 (Mass. 2009)

6
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extent that California has. Thus, this Article focuses on California's
employment arbitration doctrine to demonstrate two critical points of
general application. First, California's employment arbitration doctrine illustrates the extent to which state courts have been willing to
turn a blind eye to the U.S. Supreme Court's FAAjurisprudence in an
effort to further the public policies that ground employment regulation. Second, California's employment arbitration doctrine allows for
an exploration of the extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court's most
recent FAA jurisprudence impairs the ability of the states to safeguard the public interest and the interests of workers through employment arbitration regulation. 14 Both of these points inform the
Article's reform proposal that follows. This discussion demonstrates
the urgent need for an amendment to the FAA that will allow states
to regulate employment arbitration so as to protect the public interest and the interests of workers. This discussion also demonstrates
the need for federal oversight of this state regulation so as to protect

(holding that in light of "an "overriding" statutorily expressed public policy against
discrimination" an employment arbitration agreement relating to claims arising
under Massachusetts's employment discrimination statute "is enforceable only if such
an agreement is stated in clear and unmistakable terms"); Cardiovascular Surgical
Specialists, Corp. v. Mammana, 61 P.3d 210, 213 (Okla. 2002) (commenting that
Oklahoma's statute limiting the enforcement of covenants not to compete "was enacted to protect the people" and, holding therefore that "this public right cannot be
waived by the parties' agreement to submit the issue of the validity of a contract provision to arbitration"); Rembert v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 596 N.W.2d 208,
226, 228-30 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that "predispute agreements to arbitrate
statutory employment claims are valid if [among other things] the arbitration agreement does not waive the substantive rights and remedies of the statute and the arbitration procedures are fair so that the employee may effectively vindicate his
statutory rights" and setting out the arbitration procedures that must be included for
such an arbitration agreement to be valid); see also Sutherland v. Ernst & Young
LLP, 768 F. Supp.2d 547, 549, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), reu'd, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013)
(applying the federal and state effective-vindication exceptions to invalidate an arbitration agreement as it related to ·an employee's collective and cJass action claims for
overtime under respectively the Fair Labor Standards Act and New York state law).
14. For examples from outside of California of the U.S. Supreme Court's most
recent FAA jurisprudence being used to invalidate state public-policy based employment arbitration regulation, see Machado v. System4 LLC, 993 N.E.2d 332, 333
(Mass. 2013) (concluding that the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in American Express
Co. u. Italian Colors Restaurant "abrogates" the earlier holding of the Massachusetts
Supreme Court applying the state effective-vindication exception in the context of
claims by employees under the Massachusetts Wage Act); Sutherland v. Ernst &
Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290, 292 & n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in American Express Co. u. Italian Colors Restaurant that the
effective·vindication exception may not be applied to invalidate a class-action waiver
provision in an arbitration agreement even if the waiver removes an employee's incentive to bring an overtime claim under New York labor law).
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the interest of employers and employees in the efficient resolution of
employment disputes.
In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's 2011 decision in AT&T Mo·
bility LLC u. Concepcion 15 and the Court's 2013 decision in American
Express Co. u. Italian Colors Restaurant, 16 it is now abundantly clear
that in this game of preemption chess, the players have come to
checkmate. Neither of these recent Supreme Court cases involved
employment arbitration. MOl'eover, the latter case did not involve
FAA preemption whatsoever. Nonetheless, together Concepcion and
Italian Colors Restaurant obliterate the state effective-vindication
exception and with it much of the employment arbitration regulation
grounded on the exception. Thus, for states that seek to regulate
predispute employment arbitration agreements, the time has come to
settle upon the most favorable terms of surrender that can be negotiated. This Article proposes, therefore, a tactical retreat for the states
pursuant to which a state may continue to regulate predispute employment arbitration agreements only after a federal overseer, such
as the U.S. Department of Labor, has preapproved the specific
regulation.
Part I of this Article distills from the U.S. Supreme Court's FAA
preemption jurisprudence the eight fundamental principles of FAA
preemption. Part II considers the status of the state effective-vindication exception to the FAA's application in light of Concepcion and
Italian Colors Restaurant. Part III details how California courts have
attempted to skirt the U.S. Supreme Court's FAA jurisprudence to
safeguard the public interest and workers' rights and how Concepcion
and Italian Colors Restaurant nullify these efforts. This Part describes California's various employment arbitration doctrines and
then applies the fundamental principles of FAA preemption to
demonstrate that the FAA, as the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted it, preempts each of these doctrines. Finally, Part IV suggests
a way forward. This Part argues that a state should have the ability
to regulate predispute employment arbitration agreements so as to
protect the ability of its workers to vindicate their state statutory
rights. This Part further argues, however, that a fedel'al overseer
with expertise in workplace law matters should have veto power over

15. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
16. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).

8
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any such proposed regulation so as to maintain an appropriate balance between the public policies that ground state employment regulation on the one hand and a desire promote the FAA's policy in favor
of enforcing arbitration agreements as written on the other.
II. A PRIMER

ON

FAA

PREEMPTION

A. The Eight Fundamental Principles of FAA Preemption
Section 2 of the FAA of provides that,
A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to
perform the whole or any part thereof ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 1 7
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this language in such a
way that the FAA preempts a wide range of state efforts to regulate
arbitration contracts. From the U.S. Supreme Court's FAA jurisprudence, one is able to distill the following principles that mark the parameters of FAA preemption of state arbitration law: (1) the FAA
creates a substantive rule that applies in state courts as well as in
federal courts and preempts conflicting state law;18 (2) the FAA applies to any arbitration agreement that Congress would have the authority to regulate using the full extent of its Commerce Clause
power; 19 (3) a state may not invalidate an arbitration agreement
under a state law that is "not applicable to contracts generally'' even
ifthe state law does not undermine arbitration; 20 (4) a state law may
not "stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives" of the FAA; 21 (5) FAA preemption
applies notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies
to the contrary: the importance of a state public policy is irrelevant to
FAA preemption analysis; 22 (6) a state may not require a judicial or
administrative forum for the resolution of claims that the contracting
17. 9 u.s.c. § 2 (1947).
18. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1984).
19. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995).
20. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
21. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Leland Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477-78 (1989)
(quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
22. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983);
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehmau Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 55, 58 (1995).

Spring 2015]

FAA Preemption of State Employment Arb

9

parties have agreed to resolve by arbitration; 23 and (7) it is no defense to FAA preemption that the state-mandated forum is but a first
stop before arbitration is allowed. 24 This Article will more fully discuss these principles below in conjunction with a discussion of how
these principles act to preempt Califorma's principal employment arbitration doctrines.
Although the scope of FAA preemption is broad, the statute does
allow for some state regulation of arbitration contracts that are
within the FAA's purview. Recall section 2's Saving Clause, which
provides that a state may regulate an arbitration contract governed
by the FAA "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." It is accepted that such grounds include
fraud, duress, and unconscionability. 25
The precise meaning and effect of the Saving Clause, however,
remain topics for debate in the courts and in the academic literature. 2 6 To bring this debate into focus, assume for purposes of discussion that a state wishes to invalidate any arbitration agreement that
does not allow for class action arbitration. The fundamental principles of FAA preemption set out above make clear that a state legislature may not enact a statute that expressly invalidates any
arbitration agreement that does not allow for class action arbitration,
for such a statute would both impermissibly single out arbitration
contracts and impermissibly stand as an obstacle to the execution of
the FAA's objectives. This is so even if the statute is grounded on
express legislative findings about the important public policy reasons
for the statute. Moreover, the fundamental principles of FAA preemption also make clear that a state court may not announce a rule
that expressly invalidates any arbitration agreement that does not
23. Preston v. Ferrer, 522 U.S. 346, 349-50 (2008); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S.
483, 491 (1987).
24. Preston, 522 U.S. at 354-58. One might read Preston as holding only that a
state may not mandate a judicial or administrative forum as a first stop before arbi·
tration where the detour would "hinder speedy resolution of the controversy." Id. at
358. This author does not read Preston so narrowly.
25. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011).
26. See, e.g., David Horton Federal Arbitration Act Preempti.on, Purposivis1n,
and State Public Policy, 101 GEO. L.J. 1217, 1224 (2013) (arguing that the Saving
Clause preserves an application of state public policy that nullifies an arbitration provision when such application is grounded on a "well-supported determination that
doing so· is necessary to preserve substantive rights or remedies"); Michael J.
Yelnosky, Fully Federalizing the Federal Arbitration Act, 90 OR. L. REV. 729, 734
(2012) (arguing that "the savings clause should never have been read to require the
application of state law to disputes over the enforceability of arbitration agreements
covered by the FAA [but rather] should be read to authorize federal courts to create
federal common law to govern the enforcement of covered arbitration agreements").
1
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allow for class action arbitration: the FAA is indifferent as to whether
the state acts through its legislature or its courts.
Given these restrictions, some courts nonetheless have used general contract principles such as unconscionability and public policy to
invalidate arbitration contracts that do not allow for class action arbitration.27 The defense of such an approach relies upon the Saving
Clause and is two-fold: First, it is argued that unconscionability and
public policy can be applied to invalidate any contract. 28 Second, the
argument is made that these decisions do not single out arbitration
given that a contract that purported to preclude class actions in court
would also be held to be unconscionable or against public policy. 29
If one were to accept that a state may limit arbitration agreements in this way, by means of such "general contract defenses,"
might a state also declare unconscionable or against public policy any
arbitration agreement that does not allow for all the discovery available in court, the application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and a
unanimous decision by twelve arbitrators chosen from a jury pool assembled by a specified authority and procedure? The Supreme
Court's 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion makes
clear that section 2's Saving Clause is not allowed to swallow up the
rest of section 2 in such a way. 30 Rather, application of the general
contract doctrine must not disadvantage arbitration such that the application stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's
purposes and objectives. 31 More specifically, Concepcion teaches that
application of the general contract doctrine must not frustrate "the
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as
to facilitate streamlined proceedings."32
Each of these formulations of the holding in Concepcion is largely
derivative of several of the seven fundamental principles of FAA preemption set out above. Thus, in one sense, Concepcion adds nothing
new to the law of FAA preemption. But there are also strong arguments that Concepcion in fact adds a great deal. For in applying settled principles to delineate the scope of the Saving Clause,
27. See Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 563--S9 (Cal. 2007); Discover
Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108-10 (Cal. 2005).
28. See Gentry, 165 P.3d at 559; Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1111-12.
29. See Gentry, 165 P.3d at 465; Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1111-12; cf. SonicCalabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 247 P.3d 130, 147-48 (Cal. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 496
(2011).
30. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747-48.
31. Id. at 1748, 1753.
32. Id.
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Concepcion makes clear an eighth fundamental principle of FAA preemption: state regulation of arbitration agreements pursuant to the
Saving Clause is subject to the first seven fundamental principles of
FAA preemption.
B. Section 2's Saving Clause After AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion
This Article posits that the FAA, as the U.S. Supreme Court has
recently interpreted it, imperils the public policies that ground state
regulation of the employment relationship. Concepcion's holding and
its reasoning are central to that ai·gument. 33 It is useful, therefore, to
consider more fully Concepcion's holding and reasoning before turning to a consideration of the relationship between the FAA and state
public-policy-based employment arbitration regulation.
The general issue in Concepcion was "whether the FAA prohibits
States from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration
agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures."34
The more specific issue in the case was whether section 2 preempts
California's "Discover Bank" rule. 35 That rule classified most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable. 36
Discover Bank v. Superior Court was a 2005 California Supreme
Court case in which the court held that class action waivers should
not be enforced if (1) "the waiver is found in a consumer contract of
adhesion [(2)] in a setting in which disputes between the contracting
parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and [(3)] when
it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has
carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money."37 The California Supreme Court reasoned that, in such circumstances, "the [class action]
waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party from responsibility for its own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of
33. Cf. David Horton, Mass Arbitration and Democratfo Legitimacy, 85 U. Cow.
L. REV. 459, 502 (2014) (arguing that Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant have
enabled corporations and employers to utilize adhesive consumer and employment
arbitration contracts to "displace democratically~created rights"); David Korn & David
Rosenberg, Concepcion's Pro-Defendant Biasing of the Arbitration Process: The Class
Counsel Solution, 46 U. MrcH. J.L. REFORM 1151, 1200 (2013) (concluding that "Con·
cepcion broke a carclinal rule supported by longstanding precedent: agreements to ar·
bitrate future claims shall not undermine the law's social objectives by forcing a party
to forego effective enforcement of his or her substantive claims of right'».

34.
35.
36.
37.

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
Id. at 1746.
Id.
Discover Bank v, Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005).
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another [and, thus,] such waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not be enforced."38 In Concepcion, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted California's Discover
Bank rule.
The Court in Concepcion expressly rejected the argument that
the Discover Bank rule was compatible with section 2 because it was
a ground that existed at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract given its origins in unconscionability doctrine and the public
policy against exculpation. 39 The Court also expressly rejected the argument that the Discover Bank rule was compatible with section 2
because it applied to class action waivers in litigation as well as arbitration.40 Thus, Concepcion makes clear that these two prerequisites
to state invalidation of an arbitration contract under the Saving
Clause are necessary but not sufficient to avoid preemption.
Irrespective of whether the Discover Bank rule actually satisfied
these prerequisites, the FAA preempted the Discover Bank rule, the
Court held, because the rule stood "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."41
Chief among those objectives "is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agi·eements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings."42 The Discover Bank rule was inconsistent with
this objective, the Court concluded, in that it required the availability
of classwide arbitration. 4 3
The Court made clear that it viewed the Discover Bank rule as a
categorical rule - as effectively requiring the availability of class actions - even though the California Supreme Court had cast its rule
as a multi-factor test: the Court considered each of the three elements of the Discover Bank test and concluded that "any'' consumer
claim would meet the test. 44 AB for the first element - that "the
waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion" - the Court
noted that, "the times in which consumer contracts were anything
other than adhesive are long past."45 That is, virtually all consumer
contracts today are adhesive. AB for the second requirement - that
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
357-58
43.
44.
45.

Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 17 46--48.
Id. at 1750-53.
Id. at 1753.
Id. at 1748; see also id. at 1749 (quoting Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346,
(2008)).
Id. at 1748, 1750-51.
Id. at 1750.
Id.
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the waiver is found "in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages" the Court concluded that this requirement "is toothless and malleable" and cited a Ninth Circuit holding that damages of $4000 were
sufficiently small to satisfy the test. 46 Finally, as for the third prerequisite - that "it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large
numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money" the Court reasoned that this limitation was no limitation at all "as all
that is required is an allegation."47
The Court went on to explain in detail how requiring the availability of classwide arbitration was inconsistent with the fundamental
attributes of arbitration. First, class arbitration involves absent parties and, thus, necessitates greater procedural formality. 4s For example, in a class arbitration, the arbitrator must decide whether to
certify the class, whether the named parties are sufficiently representative and typical to qualify as class representatives, and how discovery should be conducted on behalf of the class. The absent class
members must be given notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the
right to opt out. These procedures, the Court concluded, make "the
[arbitration] process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate
procedural morass than final judgment."49
Second, class arbitration involves higher stakes for tbe respondent: "when damages allegedly owed to tens of thousands of potential
claimants are aggregated and decided at once, the risk of an error
will often become unacceptable" to the respondent in light of the only
limited judicial review that might follow an arbitration. 50 "Faced
with even a small chance of a devastating loss," the Court reasoned,
respondents "will be pressured into settling questionable claims."5 1
Thus, the Court concluded, "It is not reasonably deniable that
requiring consumer disputes to be arbitrated on a classwide basis
will have a substantial deterrent effect on incentives to arbitrate." 52
Because Discover Bank required companies either to allow class arbitration or to forego arbitration altogether and because class arbitration is so undesirable from the companies' perspective, Discover Bank
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1746, 1750.
at 1751.
at 1752.
at 1752 n.8.
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in practice presented companies with only one real option - to forego
arbitration. Thus, the Discover Bank rule impermissibly disadvantaged arbitration.
It bears emphasis that the Court was utterly indifferent to California's claimed need for the Discover Bank rule. The Court rejected
the argument that "class proceedings are necessary to prosecute
small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through the legal system."53 In response to this argument, the Court made clear that
"States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA,
even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons." 54
In sum, Concepcion severely limits a state's authority to invalidate an arbitration contract "upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract." Of critical importance to
the focus of this Article, Concepcion does so in a manner that calls
into question the very existence of the state effective-vindication exception, upon which much state employment arbitration regulation is
grounded. In Part II, therefore, this Article explicates the state effective-vindication exception and considers the implications of Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant for the exception's survival.

III.

THE FEDERAL AND STATE EFFECTIVE-V1NDIDCAT10N ExcEPrIONS
AFTER

AT&T MOBILITY LLC

v. CONCEPCION AND

AMERICAN EXPRESS Co. V. ITALIAN COLORS RESTAURANT

A. The State Effective-Vindication Exception Defined
For the purpose of understanding the state effective-vindication
exception and also for the purpose of defining the scope of this Article, it is useful first to distinguish the state effective-vindication exception from the unconscionability defense at issue in Concepcion.
The two defenses to arbitration contract enforcement share similarities and frequently overlap. 55 Yet they differ significantly in their focus. As noted earlier, the state effective-vindication exception is a
species of public policy defense. The California Supreme Court itself
53. Id. at 1753.
54. Id.; accord Marmet Health Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203--04
(2012) (holding that the FAA preempts West Virginia case law itself holding that a
predispute arbitration clause contained in a nursing home contract and relating to a
personal-injury or wrongful-death negligence claim was void "as a matter of public
policy under West Virginia law").
55. See, e.g., Chavarria v. Ralph's Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 926-27 (9th Cir.
2013) (holding that a certain arbitration agreement was unconscionable under California law and discussing in support of that holding the U.S. Supreme Court's most
recent effective-vindication exception case); In re Poly·America, L.P., Ind., 262
S.W.3d. 337, 353, 360--01 (Tex. 2008) (holding provisions of an arbitration agreement
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has noted the important distinction between the public-policy-based
effective-vindication exception and the unconscionability defense and
has explained the difference this way:
A public policy defense is concerned with the relationship of the
contract to society as a whole, and targets contractual provisions that undermine a clear public policy, such as an unwaivable statutory right designed to accomplish a public purpose.
Unconscionability is concerned with the relationship between
the contracting parties and one-sided terms such that consent in
any real sense appears to be lacking. 56
This Article is not principally concerned per se with the contractual or statutory employment rights of individual employees. Rather,
the primary focus of this Article is on the ability of a state to implement employment arbitration regulation so as to promote the public
purposes and safeguard the public interests of society as a whole that
ground that state's employment regulation. Thus, the problem that
the Article demonstrates below is that the FAA, as the U.S. Supreme
Court most recently has interpreted it, obliterates the state effectivevindication exception to arbitration contract enforcement. In doing
so, the FAA undermines the ability of a state through employment
arbitration regulation to promote the public purposes and safeguard
the public interests that ground that state's regulation of the employment relationship. Accordingly, the solution that the Article proposes
moves the public purposes and public interests that ground employment regulation back to the center of the analysis of FAA preemption
of state employment arbitration regulation.
To better understand the state effective-vindication exception, it
is useful to become familiar with the exception's relatively more securely-grounded cousin - the effective vindication of federal statutory rights exception (hereinafter federal effective-vindication
exception). In particular, to more fully appreciate this Article's argument that the state effective-vindication exception does not exist, it is
helpful to consider how the state effective-vindication exception differs from the federal effective-vindication exception in both its genesis and its scope. As the U.S. Supreme Court most recently described
the rule in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the
federal effective-vindication exception would invalidate an arbitration contract provision that purports to waive prospectively a party's
that would inhibit effective vindication of an employee's retaliatory discharge claim
"invalid, as substantively unconscionable and void").

56. Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 247 P.3d 130, 146 (Cal. 2011), vacated,
132 S. Ct. 496 (2011) (internal citations omitted).
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right to pursue a federal statutory remedy.57 Thus, the exception
would invalidate an arbitration contract provision that required an
employee to bring any claims against her employer arising from her
employment in arbitration but then, for example, also precluded the
employee from asserting any claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 58 The exception also arguably
would invalidate an arbitration contract provision that required the
employee to bring her ADEA claims in arbitration but then, for example, also provided for administrative and filing fees relating to the
arbitration that were so high that access to the arbitral forum for the
employee was impracticable.59
The federal effective-vindication exception is, at its root, an inquiry into Congressional intent. Congress has the power to exempt
claims arising under any statute from the FAA's scope.60 The U.S.
Supreme Court will look in three places for such a Congressional intent to exempt: (1) in the express text of the statute; (2) in the legislative history of the statute; and (3) in an "inherent conflict" between
arbitration and the effective vindication of rights arising under the
statute,6 1 In the case of an inherent conflict, Congressional intent to
exempt claims arising under a statute from the scope of the FAA is
implied. The federal effective-vindication exception derives from this
express or implied Congressional intent.
The theory that grounds the federal effective-vindication exception cannot logically be applied without modification in the context of
a state statute.6 2 A state legislature generally does not have the
57. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013); cf Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985) (suggesting that "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindica.te its statutory
cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute [at issue] will continue to serve both
its remedial and deterrent function").
58. See Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2310.
59. See id. at 2310-11, cf. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90
(suggesting that, "It may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could
preclude a litigant ... from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the
arbitral forum").
60. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012); Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 627-28.
61. Shearson/Am. Exptess, Inc. v. McMallon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
62. See Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans, 988 P.2d 67, 86 (Cal. 1999) (Chin, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court's FAA jurisprudence teaches "that the legal principles governing the scope and exercise of Congress's
authority to establish exceptions to the FAA may not serve as the basis for reading
into the FAA an exception for state laws that limit enforcement of arbitration agreements") (emphasis in the original); Yelnosky, supra note 26, at 752 (concluding that
"while Congress can create a federal right and guarantee judicial enforcement tegardless of the terms of a written arbitration agreement, the Court's interpretation of the
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power to enact exceptions to federal law. 6 3 Thus, arguably it is nonsensical to ask whether an inherent conflict between arbitration and
the effective vindication of rights arising under a state statute evidences a state legislature's intent to exempt claims arising under the
state statute from the scope of the FAA. 64 The state effective-vindication exception, if it exists at all, must be grounded in a theory apart
from the precise theory that grounds the effective-vindication exception in the context of a federal statute.
One such theory is that Congress, in enacting the FAA, intended
to accord some respect to a state's decision to preclude waiver of a
judicial forum where such preclusion is grounded in an important
state policy. 65 A version of this theory holds that the state effectivevindication exception is a ground "for the revocation of any contract"
within the purview of section 2's Saving Clause. 66 Absent a federal
limitation, a state may refuse, typically on public policy grounds, to
enforce a contract that purports to waive an unwaivable statutory
right. Proponents of a state effective-vindication exception would argue, therefore, that a state may refuse to enforce even an arbitration
contract that waives an unwaivable statutory right or that has the
effect of waiving an unwaivable statutory right. Indeed, the California Supreme Court has expressly invoked this "revocation of any contract" theory to justify its application of the state effective-vindication
exception so as to impose limits on predispute employment arbitration contracts. 67
FAA prevents a state legislature from doing the same thing with respect to a statecreated right").
63. Vallev. Lowe's HIW, Inc., No. 11-1489 SC, 2011 WL 3667441, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 22, 2011) (stating that "states may not exempt claims from the FAA").
64. See Yelnosky, supra note 26, at 767--08, n.192 (noting that "a similar inquiry,
determining whether the state legislature that created a state-law cause of action
intended to guarantee a judicial forum for resolution of claims, is prohibited under the
Coures FAA jurisprudence").
65. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 494--95 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "California's policy choice to preclude waivers of a judicial forum for
wage claims is entitled to respect").
66. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17-21 (1984) (St.,vens, J., concur·
ring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the judiciary must fashion grounds
for revocation under section 2's Saving Clause as a matter of federal common law and

that a state's judgment that a type of arbitration contract is invalid as contrary to
public policy may be entitled to respect). But cf Yelnosky, supra note 26, at 748 (not·
ing that Justice Stevens's argument that the Saving Clause authorized federal courts
to create federal common law relating to the enforcement of arbitration agreements
"never gained any traction").
67. See Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 988-S9 (Cal. 2003) (explaining

the theory grounding the Armendariz doctrine).
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The U.S. Supreme Court has never recognized that a state effective-vindication exception exists. In fact, the Court's FAA preemption
jurisprudence strongly implies that such an exception does not exist. ss Further, the reasoning grounding the Court's decisions in Concepcion and in Italian Colors Restaurant clearly suggests that even if
such an exception does exist, the exception does not exist in the
strong form that grounds California's employment arbitration
doctrine.
B. The Effect of Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant on the
State Effective- Vindication Exception

Concepcion was not an effective-vindication case. Nonetheless,
Concepcion makes clear that if application of the state effective-vindication exception frustrates the purposes of the FAA, the exception
must give way to the FAA regardless of the state policy at issue. As
discussed in Part I, the Court in Concepcion held that "States cannot
require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is
desirable for unrelated reasons" and, thus, it was irrelevant to FAA
preemption that "class proceedings are necessary to prosecute smalldollar claims that might otherwise slip through the legal system."69
The California Supreme Court has theorized that the state effectivevindication exception derives from section 2's Saving Clause and
merely utilizes public policy as a ground "for the revocation of any
contract." 7 Concepcion teaches that a state's regulation of an arbitration contract pursuant to section 2 is subject to each of the fundamental principles of FAA preemption. One of those fundamental
principles is that the importance of a state policy is irrelevant to FAA
preemption analysis. Thus, to the extent that the state effective-vindication exception is grounded in the theory that violation of state
public policy is a ground "for the revocation of any contract," Concepcion obliterates the exception.

°

68. See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16 n.11 (labeling "unpersuasive" the analogy between Congress enacting an exception to section 2 of the FAA and a state legislature doing so); Ferguson v. Corinthian Coils., Inc., 733 F.3d 928, 935-36 (9th Cir.
2013) (discussing the dissent in Italian Colors Restaurant and concluding that "[t)he
'effective vindication' exception, which permits the invalidation of an arbitration
agreement when arbitration would prevent the 'effective vindication' of a federal stat-

ute, does not extend to state statutes"). But cf. Yelnosky, supra note 26, at 765-70
(asserting prior to Italian Colors Restaurant that whether the state effective-vindication exception exists is an "apparently open and important question" and discussing

at length possible bases for its existence).
69. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
70. See Little, 63 P.3d at 988-89.
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Independent of Concepcion, Italian Colors Restaurant calls into
question the existence of the state effective-vindication exception and
suggests that the exception cannot save state employment arbitration regulation grounded in the doctrine. Interestingly, Italian Colors
Restaurant did not involve a state statutory right. Indeed, Italian
Colors Restaurant did not involve FAA preemption at all. Nonetheless, the case forebodes ill health for the state effective-vindication
exception generally and for state public-policy-based employment arbitration doctrine specifically.
In Italian Colors Restaurant, the respondents argued that the
federal effective-vindication exception precluded enforcement of their
arbitration contract given that the contract contained a contractual
waiver of class arbitration and given that the cost of any individual
respondent individually a1-bitrating the federal antitrust claims at issue would greatly exceed the potential recovery for such individual
claims.n Thus, the respondents argued, "[e]nforcing the waiver of
class arbitration bars effective vindication [of their rights under the
federal antitrust statute] because they have no economic incentive to
pursue their antitrust claims individually in arbitration." 72
The Court rejected the respondents' argument in such a way as
to make clear that the federal effective-vindication exception is quite
narrow. The Court reasoned that, "the fact that it is not worth the
expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute
the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy." 73 Thus, where
the arbitration contract allows the claimant to bring a claim in an
arbitral forum and where administrative and filing fees arising from
the arbitration are not so grnat as to effectively eliminate the claimant's access to the arbitral forum, the federal effective-vindication exception will not invalidate the arbitration contract even if a class
arbitration waiver renders the successful prosecution of that claim in
arbitration economically impracticable. The Court also made clear
that it was fully aware of the consequences of its narrow interpretation of the federal effective-vindication exception: the Court cited
Concepcion for the proposition that "the FAA's command to enforce
arbitration agreements trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims."7 4

71.
72.
73.
74.

Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308, 2310 (2013).
Id. at 2310.
Id. at 2311.
Id. at 2312 n.5.
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As more fully developed in Part III of this Article, the majority

opinion in Italian Colors Restaurant has dire consequences for employment arbitration doctrine grounded in the state effective-vindication exception. Arguably even more problematic, however, are the
implications for such employment arbitration doctrine arising from
Justice Kagan's dissent in Italian Colors Restaurant. In her dissent,
which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined,75 Justice Kagan argued
for a broader federal effective-vindication exception pursuant to
which "[a]n arbitration clause will not be enforced if it prevents the
effective vindication of federal statutory rights, however [the arbitration clause] achieves that result.7 6 Importantly, however, Justice Kagan argued that proof that arbitration was merely a "less convenient
or less effective" means of vindication as contrasted with proceeding
in court should not suffice to "meet the effective-vindication rule's
high bar. "77
Moreover, and most importantly, in seeking to minimize the importance of Concepcion's holding to the case at hand, Justice Kagan
made clear the dissenters' view that the state effective-vindication exception simply does not exist:
When a state rule allegedly conflicts with the FAA, we apply
standard preemption principles, asking whether the state law frustrates the FAA's purposes and objectives. If the state rule does so as the Court found in [Concepcion] - the Supremacy Clause requires
its invalidation. We have no earthly interest (quite the contrary) in
vindicating that law. Our effective-vindication rule comes into play
only when the FAA is alleged to conflict with another federal law, like
the Sherman Act here. In that all-federal context, one law does not
automatically bow to the other, and the effective-vindication rule
serves as a way to reconcile any tension between them."78
Given the view of Justices Kagan, Ginsberg, and Breyer that the
effective-vindication exception does not apply to state statutory rights
at all, it is difficult to imagine how five votes in support of the state
effective-vindication exception might be found on the current Court.
Indeed, this author would predict with great confidence that the current Court would hold that the state effective-vindication exception
simply does not exist.
To appreciate more fully the impact of Italian Colors Restaurant
in conjunction with Concepcion on public-policy-based employment
75.
76.
77.
78.

Justice Sotomayor did not pa1·ticipate in the Italian Colors Restaurant case.
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2318 n.4 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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arbitration doctrine, it is useful to consider concrete examples. Thus,
in Part III, this Article focuses on California's four principal employment arbitration doctrines. As noted earlier and as more fully-developed below, each of these doctrines ultimately derives from the
effective vindication of unwaivable state statutory rights exception to
the FAA's application.
IV. AN AUTOPSY

OF STATE EMPLOYMENT MBITRATION DOCTRINE:
THE CALIFORNIA EXN"1PLE

The California Supreme Court has created four principal employ·
ment arbitration doctrines. These doctrines, in the order of their pro·
mulgation, are (1) the Armendariz doctrine; (2) the Gentry doctrine;
(3) the unwaivability doctrine respecting the right to a Berman hear·
ing; and (4) the unwaivability doctrine respecting representative Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ("PAGA") actions. This Part
considers each of these doctrines in turn and explains how each of
these doctrines fails FAA preemption analysis. This discussion uses
the example of California law to make two points of relevance nationwide. First, this discussion demonstrates the extent to which some
courts have aggressively sought to use employment arbitration doctrine to safeguard the public policies that ground more general state
regulation of the employment relationship. Second, the discussion
also demonstrates the extent to which Concepcion and Italian Colors
Restaurant will preclude any state court or legislature from successfully doing so in the future. These two points inform the reform proposal in Part IV.
This Part proceeds along two tracks. First, consistent with the
discussion above of Concepcion and the dissent in Italian Colors Restaurant, this Part assumes that the state effective-vindication exception does not exist. In such a case, the FAA preemption analysis
becomes quite simple with respect to each of the principal California
employment arbitration doctrines - each of which is grounded on the
exception: each must "automatically bow to" the FAA. Thus, the FAA
preempts the doctrine to the extent that the doctrine conflicts with
the FAA. Second, recognizing that the particular issue of the existence of the state effective-vindication exception was not before the
Court in either Concepcion or Italian Colors Restaurant, this Part assumes for the sake of argument that a state effective-vindication exception does exist and is co-extensive with the federal effectivevindication exception as outlined in the majority opinion in Italian
Colors Restaurant. Pursuant to this track, the Article considers
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whether the state effective-vindication exception protects the California employment arbitrntion doctrine at issue from FAA preemption.

A.

The Armendariz Doctrine
1. The Rule and Its Rationale

In Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc., the
California Supreme Court held that whenever an arbitration agreement that an employer has required as a condition of employment
obligates an employee to bring in arbitration a claim arising under an
unwaivable statutory right, such as a Fair Employment and Housing
Act ("FEHA") claim, the arbitration agreement must allow the claimant to vindicate her statutory rights. 79 Accordingly, the court held,
the agreement must guarantee certain minimum procedural protections: (1) a neutral arbitrator; 80 (2) allowance of all types of relief that
normally would be available under the statute;81 (3) discovery sufficient to arbitrate the claimant's statutory claim, "including access to
essential documents and witnesses";B2 (4) a written decision and judicial review sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute - thus, a written opinion that sets out "the
essential findings and conclusions on which the award is based"; 83
and (5) limitations on the costs of arbitration - specifically, "the arbitration agreement or arbitration process cannot generally require
the employee to bear any type of expense that the employee would not
be required to bear if he or she were free to bring the action in
court."84
The Armendariz court grounded its reasoning on the state effective-vindication exception. The court first concluded that that an employee may not prospectively waive her rights under the FEHA given
that the rights the FEHA established are "for a public reason" namely to promote the public interest in a workplace free of pernicious discrimination.8 5 Any such contract waiving the rights FEHA
established, the court argued, "would be contrary to public policy and
79. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 674 (Cal.
2000); see also Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 987-89 (Cal. 2003) (extending
the Armendariz doctrine to employee claims for wrongful termination in violation of
public policy).
80. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 682.
81. Id. at 682-83.
82. Id. at 683-84.
83. Id. at 684-85.
84. Id. at 685-89.
85. Id. at 680.
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unlawful."B 6 The court further concluded that what an employer cannot do directly - namely, require an employee to waive her FERA
rights - it cannot do indirectly by means of an arbitration agreement: "In light of these principles, it is evident that an arbitration
agreement cannot be made to serve as a vehicle for the waiver of statutory rights created by the FEHA."B7 Finally, the court concluded
that absent the procedural safeguards it had set out, arbitration
would be used to force claimants to forfeit their unwaivable statutory
employment rights in violation of public policy.BB
2.

The Preemption Analysis

a. Track 1: The State Effective-Vindication Exception Does Not
Exist
Two of the five Armendariz requirements should withstand a
post-Concepcion post-Italian Colors Restaurant preemption challenge
because they do not interfere with the fundamental attributes of arbitrntion. Requiring a neutral arbitrator is fully consistent with the essence of arbitration. Moreover, requiring that the arbitrator have the
authority to grant all types of relief available under the statute that
gives rise to the claim in no way disadvantages arbitration.B 9
Each of the remaining Armendariz factors, however, stands, in
the language of Concepcion, as an obstacle to "the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate
streamlined proceedings." 90 The FAA, therefore, preempts each of
these Armendariz factors. 91 Concepcion's discussion of examples of
86. Id. at 681.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 681~9. The court in Armemkriz also held that with respect to any
claim subject to an arbitration agreement required as a condition of employment not just c1aims relating to unwaivable statutory rights - it \vould be unconscionable
for an employer to require the employee to arbitrate claims arising out of a series of
transactions or occurrences while exempting itself from arbitrating its claims arising

out of the same series of transactions or occurrences. Id. at 693-94.
89. But see Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 385~6 (expressing concern that Con-

cepcionJs efficiency rationale might prevent a court from finding an arbitration provision denying remedies such as punitive damages to be unconscionable).

90. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011).
91. See Hwang v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. CV 11-10782 PSG (JEMx),
2012 WL 3862338, at *3 n.3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2012) (stating in dicta in reference to
Armendariz that "[w]hether California public policy may invalidate certain sections of
arbitration agreements is questionable in light of Concepcion"); Antonelli v. Finish
Line, Inc., No. 5:11-cv-03874 EJD, 2012 WL 2499930, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 27, 2012)
(stating that if Armendariz requires certain minimum procedural protections for an
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impermissible uses of the public policy and unconscionability doctrines bolsters this conclusion: the Court cited as one such impermissible use "a case finding unconscionable or unenforceable as against
public policy consumer arbitration agreements that fail to provide for
judicially monitored discovery." 9 2
Granted, there is a significant difference between requiring "judicially monitored discovery" and failing to provide for "discovery sufficient to arbitrate the claimant's statutory claim, including access to
essential documents and witnesses." Still, the principal way in which
arbitration has traditionally facilitated streamlined proceedings is by
limiting discovery. 93 Arbitration has also traditionally streamlined
proceedings by not requiring a reasoned opinion and severely limiting
judicial review. Armendariz increases the costs of employment arbitration by requiring a certain level of discovery and a reasoned opinion by the arbitrator. Armendariz then mandates that the employer
bear any of these costs and any other costs that an employee incurs in
arbitration that she would not have incurred had she litigated her
claim against the employer in court. Thus, together and separately,
each of these Armendariz requirements disadvantages arbitration. 94
b. Track 2: The State Effective-Vindication Exception Does
Exist
The state effective-vindication exception does not save these procedural requirements from FAA preemption. Although the absence of
these Armendariz mandates arguably would make arbitration a less
convenient or Jess effective means for an employee to vindicate her
statutory rights, their absence does not eliminate the employee's
right to pursue relief. Indeed, a claimant denied Armendariz-mandated discovery would still have the right under section 7 of the FAA
to demand the production of witnesses and documents at the arbitration hearing. 95 Also, a claimant denied an Armendariz-mandated reasoned arbitrator opinion would still have the right to appeal the
employment arbitration arising from an arbitration agreement required as a condition of employment and relating to an unwaivable statutory right, "such a requirement would appear to be preempted by the FAA under the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Concepcion").
92. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 174 7.
93. See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 684 n.11 (acknowledging "a limitation on discovery
is one important component of the 'simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration"') (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991)).
94. Cf. Lucas v. Hertz Corp., 875 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (reasoning that Concepcion "suggests that limitations on arbitral discovery no longer support
a finding of substantive unconscionability").
95. See 9 U.S.C § 7 (1947).
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arbitration award on the limited grounds provided in sections 9 and
10 of the FAA or comparable state law. 96 And while the effective-vindication exception "would perhaps cover filing and administrative
fees attached to arbitration that are so high as to make access to the
[arbitral) forum impracticable," 97 Italian Colors Restaurant makes
clear that the doctrine cannot be stretched to allow a state to preclude the assessment of any type of arbitration fee against an employee/claimant regardless of whether the fee would make access to
the arbitral forum impractical.
B.

The Gentry Doctrine
1.

The Rule and Its Rationale

In Gentry v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held
that in a case asserting an unwaivable statutory right, such as the
right to overtime pay under the California Labor Code, class arbitration waivers should not be enforced if a trial court determines, based
upon certain specified factors, "that class arbitration would be a significantly more effective way of vindicating the rights of affected employees than individual arbitration." 98 The factors that the Gentry
court specified are (1) "the modest size of the potential individual recovery, [(2)] the potential for retaliation against members of the class,
[(3)] the fact that absent members of the class may be ill informed
about their rights, and [(4)] other real world obstacles to the vindication of class members' right to overtime pay through individual arbitration."99 Unlike the typical formulation of the state effectivevindication exception, the Gentry Doctrine does not require a finding
that the claimant would find it impractical to vindicate the statutory
right at issue in arbitration. Rather, the Gentry Doctrine requires
only that arbitration would be a significantly less effective forum for
vindicating the statutory right. Moreover, the court made clear that
the Gentry Doctrine would apply not only when the claimant herself
would find individual arbitration less effective but also when any
members of the purported class would find arbitration to be so.100
The California Supreme Court grounded its holding in Gentry in
part on the reasoning of Discover Bank, which the court discussed at
length in the Gentry opinion.1°1 The focus of the opinion and of the
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See 9 U.S.C §§ 9-10 (1947).
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310-11 (2013).
Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 559 (2007).
Id. at 568.
Id. at 568 n.7.
Id. at 560--02, 564.
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Gentry doctrine, however, is on unwaivable statutory rights, as opposed to unconscionability. 1 0 2 The court's reasoning started with the
proposition that the rights at issue in Gentry - specifically the right
to overtime compensation pursuant to section 510 of the California
Labor Code and the right to bring a private cause of action to recover
overtime wages pursuant to section 1194 of the California Labor
Code - are unwaivable. 1 oa The court noted that the rights at issue
concern not only the interests of the workers themselves "but also the
public health and general welfare." 104 For example, overtime wages
foster society's interest in a stable job market by giving employers an
incentive to spread employment throughout the work force. Finally,
the court concluded that "under some circumstances" a class arbitration waiver would lead to a de facto waiver of statutory rights. 10s In
those circumstances, the court held, public policy dictates that such a
class arbitration waiver may not be enforced. 106
2.

The Preemption Analysis

a.

Track 1: The State Effective-Vindication Exception Does Not
Exist

Broadly speaking, Gentry does exactly what the U.S. Supreme
Court said in Concepcion that a state may not do: recall that the
Court framed the issue in Concepcion as "whether the FAA prohibits
States from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration
agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures."107 The Court answered that question in the affirmative, concluding that "[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration
interferes with the fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus
creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA."108 Thus, Gentry, no less
102. See Kinecta Alternative Fin. Solutions, Inc. v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. Rptr.
3d 347, 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) ("In contrast to the unconscionability analysis in
Discover Bank, the rule in Gentry concerns the effects of a class action \Vaiver on
unwaivable statutory rights regardless of unconscionability") (internal quotations
omitted); Plows v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1069 (C.D. Cal, 2011)
(same); Arguelles-Romero v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 289, 300-02 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2010) (same).
103. Gentry, 165 P.3d at 562-63.
104. Id. at 563.
105, Id. at 563-64.
106. Id. at 569.
107. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).
108. Id. at 1748.
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th.an Discover Bank, stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of.
the FAA's objectives.109
The leading case holding that Concepcion does not preempt Gentry is Franco v. Arakelian Enterprises, lnc. 110 In Franco, the California Court of Appeal for the Second District thought it critical to the
U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Concepcion that Discover Bank established a categorical prohibition on class action waivers in consumer contracts in that Discover Bank's triggering conditions
imposed no effective limit on the rule's application because the conditions could be met in nearly every case. 111 In short, Franco held that
"Gentry is not preempted by the FAA because it is not a categorical
rule that invalidates class action waivers - the type of rule that Concepcion condemned."112
109. See Andrade v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, No. 12CV2724 JLS JMA, 2013 WL
5472589, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2013) (commenting that "the Court cannot recognize
any distinction between Discover Bank and Gentry that would preserve Gentry's applicability in light of Concepcion"); Fimby-Christensen v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc.,
No. 5:13-cv-01007-EJD, 2013 WL 6158040, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2013) (reasoning that, although Concepcion did not expressly overrule Gentry, Concepcion effectively overruled Gentry); Velazquez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 13cv680-WQH-DHB,
2013 WL 4525581, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2013) (holding that "[i]n light of Concepcion, ... Gentry is not a viable basis for invalidating the [class action waiver in an
employment arbitration] Agreement" (quoting Jasso v. Money Mart Express, Inc., 879
F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2012))); Cunningham v. Leslie's Poolmart, Inc., No.
CV 13-2122 CAS (CWx), 2013 WL 3233211, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013) (agreeing
"that the rule in Gentry is analogous to the Discover Bank rule, and therefore is preempted under Concepcion"); Truly Nolen of Am. v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d
432, 445-46 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that Discover Bank's "discredited reasoning
is the same rationale employed by the Gentry court" and, thus, "Concepcion implicitly
disapproved the reasoning of the Gentry court"); Jskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372, 379 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), review granted and opinion
superseded by 286 P.3d 147 (Cal. Sep. 19, 2012) (holding that Concepcion "conclusively invalidates the Gentry test"); Sanders v. Swift Transp. Co. of Arizona, LLC, 843
F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (Concepcion effectively overrules Gentry because Gentry "stand[s] as an obstacle to enforcement of arbitration agreements governed by the FAA"); Steele v. Am. Mortgage Mgmt. Servs., No. 2:12-cv-00085 WBS
JFM, 2012 WL 5349511, at *4 n.1 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2012) (rejecting an argument
based on Gentry because Concepcion overruled Gentry); Valle v. Lowe's HIW, Inc., No.
11-1489 SC, 2011 WL 3667441, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011) (noting that Gentry
relied upon the same precedent and logic as Discover Bank and concluding that "in
light of Concepcion, Gentry is no longer good law").
110. Franco v. Arakelian Enters., Inc., 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012),
review granted and opinion superseded by 294 P.3d 74 (Cal. Feb. 13, 2013).
111. Id. at 533, 565-67.
112. Id. at 568; see also id. at 572 (reasoning that, "As required by Concepcion,
Gentry is not a categorical rule against class action waivers but is a multifactor test).
But cf. Lewis v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(holding that "Concepcion effectively overrules Gentry" because "[l]ike Discover Bank,
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It is far from clear, however, that Concepcion would have come
out any differently had Discover Bank not been a categorical rule.
Concepcion's reasoning supports the argument that the FAA
preempts a state doctrine that is applied in any given case to require
arbitration to have features that are inconsistent with the parties'
agreement and with the nature of arbitration. Indeed, the California
Supreme Court has recently interpreted Concepcion to have precisely
this meaning. 113
Moreover, the Gentry factors - whether or not they compose a
categorical rule - frame an inquiry into whether enforcement of the
arbitration agreement at issue as written would impair California's
interest in ensuring the effective vindication of an unwaivable statutory right. Concepcion makes clear, however, that California's interests are irrelevant to FAA preemption analysis. The critical issue
instead is whether application of the Gentry doctrine in a given case
interferes with the fundamental attributes of arbitration. The Gentry
factors - whether or not they compose a categorical rule - do not
speak at all to that issue. The supposed non-categorical nature of the
Gentry factors, therefore, cannot provide a sensible basis for distinguishing Gentry from Discover Bank. Thus, the FAA would preempt
Gentry in any case in which Gentry would be applied to invalidate a
class action waiver, even if Gentry does not categorically invalidate
class action waivers.
In any event, Gentry's triggering conditions impose no more effective a limit on the Gentry rule's application than did Discover
Bank's triggering conditions with respect to the Discover Bank rule's
application. 114 Gentry's first factor - the modest size of the potential
individual recovery - is the same Discover Bank factor that the U.S.
Gentry advances a rule of enforcement that applies specifically to arbitration provisions, as opposed to a general rule of contract interpretation").
113. See Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184, 201 (Cal. 2013) (holding
that "after Concepcion, unconscionability remains a valid defense to a petition to compel arbitrationn but Concepcion clarifies that state unconscionability rules "must not
disfavor arbitration as applied by imposing procedural requirements that interfere
with fundamental attributes of arbitration") (internal quotations omitted); Iskanian
v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC., 327 P.3d 129, 135-36 (Cal. 2014).
114. See Reyes v. Liberman Broad., Inc., 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 622-25 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2012), reuiew granted and opinion superseded by 288 P.3d 1287 (Cal. Dec. 12,
2012) (discussing the similarities between the Dmcouer Bank triggering conditions
and those of Gentry); Jasso v. Money Ma1t Express, Inc., 879 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1044
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (noting the similarities between the Discover Bank triggering conditions and those of Gentry and finding "no principled basis to distinguish between the
Discover Bank rule and tbe rule in Gentry, given the broad language used by the
Supreme Court in Concepcion"); Morvant v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 870 F.
Supp. 2d 831, 840-41 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (same).
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Supreme Court in Concepcion found to be "toothless and malleable. "115 Evidencing just how toothless and malleable this factor is, the
court in Gentry cited approvingly a California Court of Appeal decision rejecting the argument that a $37,000 award would be ample
incentive for an attorney to pursue an individual lawsuit for wage
and hour violations. 116 With respect to Gentry's second factor - the
potential for retaliation against members of the class - the Gentry
court argued that, "Given that retaliation would cause immediate
disruption of the employee's life and economic injury, and given that
the outcome of the complaint process is uncertain, ... fear of retaliation will often deter employees from individually suing their employers."117 Yet the potential for retaliation exists in every case where an
employer or former employer might impose economic injury on the
claimant. Even a former employee might fear a future negative reference from the employer she is suing. Thus, this factor could be found
in almost any case. With respect to Gentry's third factor - the fact
that absent members of the class may be ill informed about their
rights - the court again set the bar low, noting that "even English
speaking or better educated employees may not be aware of the nuances of overtime laws with their sometimes complex classifications
of exempt and non-exempt employees." 118 Indeed, such nuances frequently escape even sophisticated employers and employment lawyers. If the test is an employee's lack of understanding of the nuances
of American employment law, this factor as well could be found in
almost any case. As for Gentry's fourth factor - the presence of other
real world obstacles to the vindication of class members' right to overtime pay through individual arbitration - the factor is sufficiently
ambiguous such that it should pose no obstacle to the application of
the Gentry doctrine in any case.
b.

Track 2: Th£ State Effective- Vindication Exception Does
Exist

The state effective-vindication exception, as cabined by Italian
Colors Restaurant, does not save the Gentry Doctrine from FAA preemption.119 The concern at the heart of Gentry is that class arbitration waivers eliminate the most practical means to bring claims that
115. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011).
116. Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 564 (2007).
117. Id. at 566.
118. Id. at 567.
119. See Cunningham v. Leslie's Poolmart, Inc., No. CV 13-2122 CAS (CWx), 2013
WL 3233211, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013) (citing Italian Colors Restaurant in
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otherwise would be too small to warrant individual arbitration or litigation.120 Gentry is also concerned with other potential disincentives
to bring claims - such as fear of retaliation and inadequate knowledge of one's statutory rights. 121 Italian Colors Restaurant makes
clear, however, that the effective-vindication exception is concerned
with the right to pursue a remedy, but not with the incentive to pursue a remedy and that the FAA is more concerned with enforcing arbitration agreements .as written than with facilitating the
prosecution oflow-value or otherwise unattractive claims. 122 Finally,
Justice Kagan's dissent suggests that the Court would look with
great disfavor upon the Gentry Doctrine's application in cases in
which arbitration is a practical but "significantly less effective" forum
for vindication of a state statutory right. Recall Justice Kagan's admonition that proof that arbitration was a "less convenient or less
effective" means of vindication would fail to "meet the effective-vindication rule's high bar."12a
Indeed, in June 2014, the California Supreme Court held in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC that, in light of Concepcion, the FAA preempts the Gentry doctrine. 124 The court first
rejected the argument that the Gentry doctrine might meaningfully
be distinguished from the Discover Bank rule because the latter but
not the former is a categorical rule against class action waivers. "It
is ... incorrect to say the infirmity of Discover Bank was that it did
not require a case-specific showing that the class waiver was exculpatory,'' the court reasoned. "Concepcion holds that even if a class
waiver is exculpatory in a particular case, it is nonetheless preempted by the FAA." 125 The court went on to hold quite simply that,
under the logic of Concepcion, the FAA preempts the Gentry doctrine

rejecting the argument that Gentry remains good law under the effective-vindication
exception); Andrade v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, No. 12CV2724 JLS JMA, 2013 WL
5472589, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2013) (concluding that Italian Colors Restaurant
supports the argument that the FAA preempts Gentry).
120. Gentry, 165 P.3d at 565.
121. Id. at 565-67.
122. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) (clarifying that "the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory
remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy''); id. at
2312 n.5 (declaring that "the FAA's command to enforce arbitration agreements
trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of lovJ-value claims").
123. Id. at 2318 n.4 (Kagan J., dissenting).
124. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 135-37 (2014).
125. Id. at 364.
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because the Gentry doctrine "mandat[es] or promot[es] procedures incompatible with arbitration."126
C.

The Unwaivability Doctrine Respecting the Right to a Berman
Hearing
1.

The Rule and Its Rationale

A worker with a California state claim for unpaid wages has two
routes she can take to recovery. She can file an ordinary civil action
against her employer for the wages. In the alternative, she can pursue relief at an administrative hearing commonly referred to as a
"Berman hearing" after the surname of its legislative sponsor.1 27
The Berman route begins with a hearing before the Lahm· Commissioner. If the employee obtains an award at the Berman hearing,
the employer may request de nova review in superior court. The
Berman route contains several provisions designed to aid the employee and to deter frivolous employer appeals. First, the Lahm Commissioner will represent the employee in superior court if the
employee is trying to uphold the Labor Commissioner's award and is
unable to afford counsel. Second, to appeal, the employer must post
an "undertaking'' in the full. amount of the award. Finally, an employer who is unsuccessful in the appeal must pay the employee's attorney's fees. The employer is "unsuccessful" if the employee receives
more than zero after the appea1.12s
In 2011, the California Supreme Court held in Sonic-Calabasas
A, Inc. v. Moreno (hereinafter Sonic [) that an arbitration agreement
that an employee enters into as a condition of employment that requires the employee to bring her wage claims against the employer in
arbitration and, therefore, to forego a Berman hearing, is both contrary to public policy and unconscionable. 129 The court further held,
however, that an employer who had entered into an arbitration
agreement with its employee could bring an appeal of a Berman hearing award in arbitration. 1ao
Notably, the court in Sonic I did not hold that the arbitration
agreement was against public policy because it prevented vindication
of the unwaivable statutory right to wages due. Rather, the court
held that the unwaivable statutory right at issue was the right to a
126. Id. at 366.
127. Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 247 P.3d 130, 133, 135 (Cal. 2011), vacated, 132 S. Ct. 496 (2011).
128. Id. at 133, 136-37.
129. Id. at 139-46.
130. Id. at 133, 137-39.
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Berman hearing and its related protections and that it would violate
public policy for an employer to compel an employee to relinquish
that unwaivable right in favor of arbitration. 131 The court grounded
this conclusion on its finding of the California legislature's implied
intent. In short, the court reasoned that the legislature must have
intended to prohibit employers from requiring employees as a condition of employment to waive their right to a Berman hearing since
such waivers "would seriously undermine the efficacy of the Berman
hearing statutes and hence thwart the public purpose behind the
statutes" of ensuring that workers receive wages that are owed
them. 132 Thus, the court held that the arbitration agreement in Sonic
I violated public policy because it waived the unwaivable statutory
right to a Berman hearing.133
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the decision in Sonic
I and remanded to the California Supreme Court for further consideration in light of Concepcion. 134 In June 2013, still not having issued
an opinion on remand, the California Supreme Court called for further briefing in light of Italian Colors Restaurant.135
2. The Preemption Analysis

a. Track 1: The State Effective-Vindication Exception Does Not
Exist
Sonic I violates the fundamental principle of FAA preemption
that a state may not require a judicial or administrative forum for the
resolution of claims that the contracting parties have agreed to resolve by arbitration even if the state-mandated forum is but a first
stop before arbitration is allowed. 136 In Preston u. Ferrer, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that, ''When parties agree to arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, the FAA supersedes state laws lodging
primary jurisdiction in another forum, whether judicial or administrative."137 Preston involved the California Talent Agencies Act
131. Id. at 140.
132. Id. at 141.
133. The court further found that such a contract was both a contract of adhesion
and, thus, was procedurally unconscionable, and "markedly one-sided" in that it could
only benefit the employer at the expense of the employee" and, thus, \vas substantively unconscionable. Id. at 145-46.
134. Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 132 S. Ct. 496 (2011),
135. See Docket (Register of Actions), Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc, v. Moreno, available
at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=O&doc_id=l913
305&doc_no=S174475 (noting supplemental briefing ordered).
136. See Sonic-Calabasas, 247 P.3d at 161 (Chin, J. dissenting).
137. Preston v. Ferrer, 522 U.S. 346, 359 (2008).
11
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("TAA''), which vested exclusive original jurisdiction over a dispute
arising under the TAA in the Labor Commissioner subject to de novo
review in superior court following the Labor Commissioner's
determination. ms
In holding that the FAA preempted the exclusive jurisdiction
provisions of the TAA, the Court rejected the argument that the TAA
did not offend the FAA because it only postponed arbitration in that a
party could seek arbitration rather than de novo review in superior
court after the Labor Commissioner issued her ruling. The Court reasoned that, "A prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to
achieve 'streamlined proceedings and expeditious results'" 139 and
that requiring initial reference of an otherwise arbitrable dispute to
the Labor Commissioner would frustrate that objective even if arbitration could follow. 140 The Court also rejected the argument that allowing parties to arbitrate in lieu of an administrative hearing
process "would undermine the Labor Commissioner's ability to stay
informed of potential illegal activity ... and would deprive artists
protected by the TAA of the Labor Commissioner's expertise."141 In
sum, the Court held that, when the FAA applies, a state cannot require that an arbitrable claim be heard first in a non-arbitral forum,
regardless of the state's reason for doing so.
b.

Track 2: The State Effective-Vindication
Exception Does Exist

Concepcion reinforces Preston's central holdings and makes clear
that these principles apply even when the state seeks to regulate arbitration via the effective-vindication exception by invoking public
policy as a ground "for the revocation of any contract." In the language of Concepcion, Sonic I "interferes with the fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the
FAA."142 As previously noted, Sonic I adds a layer of delay and expense to the parties' arbitration agreement: the parties must first
participate in an administrative hearing before they may proceed to
arbitration. Moreover, Sonic I punishes an employer that enforces its
contractual right to arbitrate and in so doing impermissibly "disfavors arbitration." 143 To obtain "de novo" review before the arbitrator,
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 351, 355.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 358; see also Sonic·Calabasas, 247 P.3d at 161 (Chin, J., dissenting).
Preston, 552 U.S. at 358-59.
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011).
See id. at 1747.
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the employer must post an undertaking in the full amount of the Labor Commissioner's award. Also, if the arbitrator awards the employee more than zero following a Berman hearing, the employer
must pay the employee's attorney's fees. As did Preston, Concepcion .
makes clear that California "cannot require [such) a procedure that is
inconsistent with the FAA even if it is desirable for unrelated
reasons." 144
The court in Sonic I sought to distinguish Preston by arguing
that the statute in Preston "merely lodges primary jurisdiction in the
Labor Commissioner, and does not come with the same type of statutory protections as are found in the Berman hearing and posthearing
procedures." 145 The fact that the Berman process offers an employee
special advantages in her effort to collect wages due her, however,
cannot allow the state to obviate Preston's limitations. Indeed, litigation generally also offers claimants certain special advantages such
as the rights to comprehensive discovery, certain rules of evidence,
and ultimate disposition by ajury. Yet Concepcion makes clear that a
state may not condition the enforceability of an arbitration agreement on the availability of such special advantages. 146 Moreover,
even if waiver of the right to a Berman hearing process outside of
arbitration "would seriously undermine the efficacy of the Berman
hearing statutes,''1 47 such waiver "does not constitute the elimination
of the right to pursue" a remedy for wages owed. 148 Thus,ltalian Colors Restaurant teaches that the effective-vindication exception will
not exempt California's efforts to invalidate waivers of the Berman
hearing process in favor of arbitration even if arbitration would be a
"less convenient or less effective" mea.ns of vindication. 149 California
cannot escape preemption by labeling the Berman hearing process
itself rather than the right to wages owed the "unwaivable statutory
right" at issue any more than it could do so by applying that label to a
litigation process with ~he right to comprehensive discovery, certain
rules of evidence, and ultimate disposition by a jury.
Indeed, in October 2013, the California Supreme Court conceded
in Sonic II that the FAA preempts the California doctrine providing
for an unwaivable right to a Berman hearing after all.150 The court
144. Id. at 1753.
145. Sonic-Calabasas, 247 P.3d at 150.
146. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747; see also Sonic-Calabasas, 247 P.3d at 162,
166 (Chin, J., dissenting).
147. Sonic-Calabasas, 247 P.3d at 141.
148. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013).
149. Id. at 2318 n.4 (Kagan J., dissenting).
150. Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 3ll P.3d 184, 198 (Cal. 2013).
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reasoned in light of Concepcion that, "Because a Berman hearing
causes arbitration to be substantially delayed, the unwaivability of
such a hearing , , . interferes with a fundamental attribute of arbitration - namely, its objective 'to achieve streamlined proceedings and
expeditious results.'" 151 The court further acknowledged that the
state public policy that grounds the Sonic I doctrine does not shield
the doctrine from FAA preemption.1s2

D. The Unwaivability Doctrine Respecting Representative Labor
Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ("PAGA'')
Actions
1. The Rule and Its Rationale
California's "Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004"
("PAGA") authorizes an employee to bring an action to recover civil
penalties for Labor Code violations on her own behalf and on behalf
of other current or former employees. 153 In general, any civil penalties recovered by aggrieved employees under the PAGA are split with
seventy-five percent going to the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency and twenty-five percent going to the aggrieved employees - not only to the employee who brought the PAGA action but
also to the other employees who suffered the Labor Code violation. 154
Thus, the employee bringing a representative PAGA action acts as a
private attorney general to collect penalties from the employer, to
punish and deter Labor Code violations, and to protect the public
from the employer's illegal actions. Class action requirements do not
apply to PAGA representative actions.155
When an employee has signed an arbitration agreement agreeing
to bring any claim against her employer in arbitration and waiving
any right to bring a PAGA representative action in arbitration (or in
court), two issues arise: whether the employee's waiver of her right to
bring a PAGA representative action is enforceable under California
law, and whether, if not, the FAA preempts California law invalidating the waiver.
151. Id. at 198 (quoting Concepcion, 131 S. Ct at 1749). The court further held,
ho\vever, that a contract waiving a Berman hearing in favor of arbitration might still
be held unconscionable if the contract "make[s] the resolution of the wage dispute
inaccessible and unaffordable." Id. at 204.
152. Id. at 199.
153. Cal. Labor Code §§ 2698-2699.5.
154. Cal. Labor Code § 2699(i); Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 327
P.3d 129, 148 (Cal. 2014),
155. Arias v, Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923, 932 (Cal. 2009).
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Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. is the seminal California appellate
case holding that (1) an arbitration waiver of a representative PAGA
action is not enforceable under California law, and (2) the FAA does
not preempt California law on this point. 156 With respect to the first
holding, the Brown court reasoned that a PAGA representative action waiver is not enforceable under California law because such a
waiver would defeat the purposes of the PAGA: "[Al single-claimant
arbitration under the PAGA for individual penalties will not result in
the penalties contemplated under the PAGA to punish and deter employer practices that violate the rights of numerous employees under
the Labor Code."157
In holding that the FAA does not preempt California's invalidation of a PAGA representative action waiver, the Brown court first
distinguished Concepcion, reasoning that Concepcion dealt with a
private individual right of a consumer to pursue class action remedies
but did not address a cause of action designed to protect the public
rather than to benefit private parties. 158 The court went on to reason
in accord with a state effective-vindication exception that the FAA
did not preempt California law because such preemption would defeat the purposes of the state law. 159 "In short, representative actions
under the PAGA do not conflict with the purposes of the FAA. If the
FAA preempted state law as to the unenforceability of the PAGA representative action waivers, the benefits of private attorney general
actions to enforce state labor laws would, in large part, be nullified."1so Finally, the court added that because PAGA actions are not

156. See Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(extending California's Broughton-Cruz rule to PAGA actions and holding that Concepcion does not preempt a state rule regarding the unenforceability of a contractual
waiver of an employee's right to pursue a representative action under the PAGA be-

cause "representative actions under the PAGA do not conflict with the purposes of the
FAA").
157. Id. at 862; cf. Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1164
(C.D. Cal. 2011) (finding that "because the PAGA arbitration waiver contradicts the
fundamental purpose of a representative enforcement action under PAGA, it is uncon-

scionable and unenforceable"), vacated an other grounds, 726 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir.
2013).
158. Brown, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 860-£4; accord Plows v. Rockwell Collins, Inc.
812 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (agreeing with the Brown court's reasoning with respect to this point).
159. Brown, 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 862-£3.
160. Id.
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subject to class action requirements, a PAGA representative arbitration "would not have the attributes of a class action that the [Concepcion] case said conflicted with arbitration, such as class certification,
notices, and opt-outs."161
The California Supreme Court endorsed the unwaivability docti·ine respecting representative PAGA actions in its June 2014 Iskanian opinion - the same opinion, discussed above, in which the
court held that the FAA preempted the Gentry doctrine. 162 The court
first held that under California law an agreement by an employee to
waive her right to bring a representative PAGA action "is against
public policy and may not be enforced."16 3 In so holding, the court
reasoned that enforcement of such an agreement would "serve to disable one of the primary mechanisms for enforcing the Labor Code"
and, thus, would both impermissibly indirectly exempt an employer
from responsibility for its violations of the Labor Code and impermissibly allow a private agreement to contravene a law established for a
public reason. 164 The court cited the Brown court of appeal in concluding that, even if an employee remains free to bring an individual
PAGA claim, the employee's waiver of her right to bring a representative PAGA action would frustrate the PAGA's objectives. The court
supported this conclusion by reasoning that the arbitration of an individual PAGA claim would not result in the types of penalties that
the PAGA contemplates to deter employer violations of the Labor
Code and to punish employer violations that do occur. 165
Having concluded that an employee's waiver of her right to bring
a representative PAGA action "is contrary to public policy and unenforceable as a matter of state law"166 the court next turned to the
question of whether the FAA preempted such a state rule. In answering this question, the court did not seriously address Concepcion or
Italian Colors Restaurant. Rather, the court held that the FAA did
not apply at all to the unwaivability doctrine respecting representative PAGA actions because the FAA is concerned only with the resolution of private disputes whereas a PAGA action is not a private
dispute:l 6 7 "Simply put, a PAGA claim lies outside the FAA's coverage because it is not a dispute between an employer and an employee
161.
162.
2014).
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 503.
Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC., 327 P.3d 129, 145-53, (Cal.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id. at 149.
Id.
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arising out of their contractual relationship. It is a dispute between
an employer and the state" in that the employee's PAGA action ''functions as a substitute for an action brought by the government
itself."1as
To support its novel conclusion that the FAA is concerned only
with "private disputes," the court first cited to the F AA's text. Specifically, the court focused on language in section 2 referencing a contract "to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction." This phrase, the court reasoned, "is
most naturally read to mean a dispute about the respective rights
and obligations of parties in a contractual relationship." 169 The court
also cited to the F AA's legislative history, which the court found
"shows that the F AA's primary object was the settlement of ordinary
commercial disputes."170 "There is no indication," the court concluded, "that the FAA was intended to govern disputes between the
government in its law enforcement capacity and private
individuals." 171
The California Supreme Court's reasoning in Iskanian might be
criticized on several grounds. The court's interpretation of the FAA's
text is implausible. The touchstone for FAA coverage is a written arbitration provision in "a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce."172 The natural reading of section 2 is that the FAA applies to any such contract regardless of the nature of the dispute to be
arbitrated unless another provision of the FAA173 or another federal
statute174 provides otherwise. No such other provision of the FAA or
federal statute supports the California Supreme Court's holding.
Moreover, the California Supreme Court's resort to the FAA's
legislative history to support its interpretation of section 2 is unconvincing. The court cites to the 1924 Congressional testimony of Julius
Cohen, the principal drafter of the FAA, and Charles Bernheimer, the
Chairman of the Committee on Arbitration of the New York State
Chamber of Commerce, for the proposition that the FAA was intended to apply only to disputes between merchants. 175 It is all well
and good to cite Cohen and Bernheimer to support the argument that
the Supreme Court has gone off track in interpreting the scope of
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 151 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 150.
Id.
Id.
9 u.s.c. § 2.
See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (excluding certain contracts from the FAA's coverage).
See infra note 223 (discussing several such statutes).
Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 150 (Cal. 2014).
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FAA coverage as broadly as it has: unquestionably, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the FAA has betrayed the drafters' original
intent. Nonetheless, when faced with a mountain of Supreme Court
jurisprudence interpreting the FAA broadly, a state court is not free
to side with the ghost of Julius Cohen.
Moreover, even if one were to accept the California Supreme
Court's interpretation of the FAA as being concerned only with "ensur[ing) an efficient forum for the resolution of private disputes,"176
one might question the court's characterization of Iskanian's lawsuit
as falling outside that scope. Iskanian was a private employee who
entered into a contract with his private employer in which he agreed
that he would submit "any and all claims" against his employer to
private binding arbitration. 177 Iskanian later brought a lawsuit
against his employer on his own behalf and on behalf of other private
employees of the employer for violations of the Labor Code. Iskanian
had standing to bring his PAGA claim only because he was "an aggrieved employee" of the employer as the PAGA defines that term "any person who was employed by the alleged violator [of the Labor
Code) and against whom one or more of the alleged violations was
committed." 178 Indeed, Iskanian's complaint alleged that his employer's practices with respect to himself and other private employees
violated the Labor Code. Iskanian sought civil penalties for himself
and other private employees that would go directly into his own
pocket and the pockets of his fellow employees. 179 Even though seventy-five percent of the penalties collected would go to the state, it is
difficult to accept the court's conclusion that such "a PAGA claim ...
is not a dispute between an employer and an employee arising out of
their contractual relationship."1 80 Accordingly, this Article shall proceed to examine whether California's unwaivability doctrine respecting representative PAGA actions can survive FAA preemption
analysis assuming that the FAA does apply to such an action.

176. Id at 149.
177. Id. at 133 (internal quotation marks omitted).
178. Id. at 157 (internal quotation marks omitted); Cal. Lab. Code§ 2699(c) (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 146 (2014).
180. Id. at 146, 151; see also id. at 155 (Chin, J., concurring) (arguing that the
dispute in this case "arises, first and fundamenfally, out of [the employment] relation·
ship" between Iskanian and his employer).
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2. The Preemption Analysis

a. Track 1: The State Effective-Vindication Exception
Does Not Exist

Concepcion makes clear that the unwaivability doctrine respecting representative PAGA actions is inconsistent with the FAA.181
Even though a representative PAGA action would not present the
class certification, notice, and opt-out issues that are normally considered incompatible with the FAA, requiring the allowance of PAGA
representative actions in arbitration would provide employers with a
substantial disincentive to arbitrate such that the reasonable employer may forgo arbitration. Arbitration of a representative PAGA
action in which penalties relating to multiple employees are aggregated presents the risk of an enormously costly error in arbitration
that will go uncorrected in light of the extremely deferential judicial
review to which arbitration awards are subject. 18 2 The Court addressed such a disincentive in Concepcion: "We find it hard to believe
that defendants would bet the company with no effective means of
review, and even harder to believe that Congress would have intended to allow state courts to force such a decision." 1 83
b. Track 2: The State Effective-Vindication Exception
Does Exist
The state effective-vindication exception does not save the unwaivability doctrine respecting representative PAGA actions. Central
to the holding in Brown is the notion that a state public policy
preempts the FAA whenever the FAA otherwise would undermine
the state public policy. At first blush, this notion would appear to
181. See e.g., Velazquez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 13cv680-WQH-DHB, 2013
WL 4525581, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2013) (discussing Concepcion and holding that
the FAA preempts the unwaivability doctrine respecting representative PAGA actions); Andrade v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, No. 12CV2724 JLS JMA, 2013 WL
5472589, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2013) (same).
182. See Quevedo v. Macy's, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1142 (C.D. Cal. 2011)
(holding that requiring a PAGA representative action in arbitration would conflict
with the FAA's purposes because such an action would "make for a slower, more
costly process" and "representative PAGA claims increase risks to defendants by aggregating the claims of many employees") (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011)) (internal quotation omitted); Grabowski v. C.H.
Robinson Co., 817 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1180-81 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (adopting the reasoning
of Quevedo and rejecting tile reasoning of Brown); Miguel v. J.P Morgan Chase Bank,
N.A., No. CV 12-3308 PSG (PLAx), 2013 WL 452418, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2013)
(adopting the reasoning of Quevedo).
183. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011) (footnote
omitted).
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turn the Supremacy Clause on its head. 184 It is likely, however, that
the Brown court merely was invoking a blunt formulation of the state
effective-vindication exception. Stated more fully, the notion is that
Congress intended for a state public policy to preempt the FAA whenever the FAA otherwise would undermine the state public policy.
This notion finds no support, however, in the U.S. Supreme
Court's FAA preemption jurisprudence. Indeed, the Court has held
clearly that the FAA trumps any state public policy that conflicts
with the federal policy in favor of arbitration that grounds the FAA.
In Perry v. Thomas, for example, the Court considered whether the
. FAA preempted a section of the California Labor Code that provided
that an action for the collection of wages may be maintained in court
"without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate."185 The employee in Perry argued that, "the State's interest in
protecting wage earners outweighs the federal interest in uniform
dispute resolution." 186 In holding that the FAA preempted the Californ_ia statute, the Court expressly rejected this argument stating,
"Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal policy favoring
arbitration agreements notwithstanding any state substantive or
procedural policies to the contrary."187 Concepcion makes clear that
this fundamental principle of FAA preemption applies even when the
state purports to act pursuant to section 2's Saving Clause. Rejecting
the argument that class proceedings were essential to prosecute
small-value claims that otherwise would not be worth pursuing as
individual claims, the Court in Concepcion reiterated that "States
cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if
it is desirable for unrelated reasons." 188
Italian Colors Restaurant also suggests that the state effectivevindication exception, if it exists, does not authorize the state to invalidate an employee's waiver of her right to bring a representative
PAGA action in arbitration. Such a waiver "does not constitute the
184. Cf Luchini v. Carmax, Inc., No. CV F 12-0417 WO DLB, 2012 WL 3862150,
at •s (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2012) (discussing Concepcwn and concluding that "[a] PAGA
claim is a state-law claim, and states may not exempt claims from the FAA1' (citations
omitted)).
185. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 484 (1987) (quoting Cal. Lab. Code Ann.
§ 229) (internal quotation marks omitted).
186. Id. at 486.
187. Id. at 489, 491 (citations omitted) (internal quotations marks omitted).
188. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753; see also Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles,
LLC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372, 384 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), review granted and opinion
superseded by 286 P.3d 147 (Cal. Sep. 19, 2012) (concluding that under Concepcion it
is "irrelevant" that a PAGA action can effectively promote the public interest only ifit
takes place outside of arbitration).
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elimination of [any employee's] right to pursue" penalties under the
PAGA.1a 9 Each employee remains free to bring an individual claim to
enforce the Labor Code and to deter and penalize the employer with
respect to Labor Code violations that relate to her personally. 190
Whether or not it is worth the expense for any individual employee to
prove her individual case is not of concern under the effective-vindication exception. 191 Moreover, Justice Kagan's dissent in Italian Colors Restaurant suggests that the fact that an individual PAGA action
is "less convenient or less effective" than a representative PAGA action is also not a concern under the effective-vindication exception. rn2
Finally, even assuming a series of Labor Code violations that
would not be worth the expense of pursuing on an individual basis,
the state retains the right to pursue civil penalties relating to multiple employees to vindicate its interests that would otherwise be vindicated in an employee-brought PAGA representative action. California
is not a party to the employment arbitration agreement between the
employer and its employee. Moreover, an employment arbitration

189. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) (citation omitted).
190. See Parvataneni v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 967 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1301 n.1, 1305
(N.D. Cal. 2013) (rejecting the view that PAGA claims cannot be brought on an individual basis and holding that an arbitration agreement may waive an employee's
right to bring a representative PAGA claim since the employee "may still attempt to
vindicate his rights by arbitrating his PAGA claims individually''). Some courts have
held that the PAGA does not authorize an employee to bring a separate individual
claim: rather an individual may maintain a PAGA action only as a representative
action. See Brown v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 779, 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013);
Cunningham v. Leslie's Poolmart, Inc., No. CV 13-2122 CAS (CWx), 2013 WL
3233211, at *8 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2013). If that interpretation were correct, a waiver
of the right to bring a PAGA representative action would indeed constitute the elimination of the employee's right to pursue a PAGA claim. See Brown, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d
at 791; Cunningham, 2013 WL 3233211 at *9. Whether or not the FAA would preempt a state doctrine voiding such a waiver would then depend on whether or not the
state effective-vindication exception exists. See Brown, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 781 (holding, in a case decided two weeks prior to Italian Colors Restaurant, that an arbitration agreement waiving the right to bring a representative PAGA claim "is
unenforceable because it wholly precludes the exercise of this unwaivable statutory
right" (citation omitted)); Cunningham, 2013 WL 323321 at *9 (citing and quoting
Italian Colors Restaurant in support of the holding that the FAA does not preempt a
doctrine voiding an arbitration waiver of a PAGA representative action since such a
waiver would wholly preclude the PAGA cause of action and an "arbitration provision
need not be enforced to the extent that it forbids the assertion of statutory rights"
(internal quotation omitted)).
191. See Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2311 (citation omitted).
192. See id. at 2318 n.4.
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agreement between employer and employee cannot foreclose direct
enforcement by California.193
In sum, each of California's four principal employment arbitration doctrines is grounded on two premises. First, the California employment regulation at issue with respect to the doctrine not only
protects the private interests of employees but also serves a compelling public interest. Second, arbitration of claims asserting the statutory right at issue not only impedes the effective vindication of the
employee's statutory right at issue but also imperils the compelling
public interest.
The FAA, however, as the U.S. Supreme Court has recently interpreted it, is wholly unconcerned with state public interests, no
matter how compelling. Consequently, FAA preemption of state employment arbitration doctrine puts at risk the public interests that
ground regulation of the employment 1·elationship. This Article next
turns to an argument that the FAA should be amended to allow for
consideration of the extent to which arbitration threatens the ability
of workers to effectively vindicate their statutory employment rights
and, relatedly, undermines the ability of those statutory employment
rights to serve the public interest.
V. AN

ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERAL ALLOWANCE OVERSIGHT

This Part proceeds by first setting out an argument for the special regulation of employment arbitration separate and apart from
any regulation of consumer arbitration: unlike consumer arbitration,
employment arbitration threatens interacting private and public interests relating to both individual and group identity and equality.
Next, this Part identifies several pitfalls facing potential reform proposals and prnposes a compromise solution that is premised on restructuring federal oversight of state employment arbitration
doctrine.

193. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 279 (2002) (holding that an
arbitration agreement between an employer and its employee does not foreclose the
EEOC's efforts to obtain in court victim-specific relief relating to the employee).
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A. The Stakes in Employment Arbitration Regulation
Distinguished from Those in Consumer Arbitration
Regulation: Implications for Individual and Group
Identity and Equality
As demonstrated above, Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant make clear that the FAA preempts any state arbitration regulation that disadvantages arbitration. This is so regardless of the public
policy that grounds the regulation and regardless of whether the regulation is necessary to ensure that a claimant may effectively vindicate her state statutory rights. In the employment context
specifically, it is irrelevant to FAA preemption whether the state arbitration regulation is necessary to protect the rights of workers or
the general public interest.
This Article postulates that Concepcion and Italian Colors Restaurant also make elem· the need for Congress to amend the FAA. As
a normative matter, the FAA should allow for consideration of the
public interest in determining whether an employment arbitration
agreement will be enforceable.1 94 Specifically, the FAA should allow
for consideration of the need for a worker to effectively vindicate her
state statutory rights and for consideration of her ability to do so in
arbitration.
In negotiating the terms of an employment relationship, an employer typically possesses both greater bargaining power and more
complete relevant information than its employee. 195 Thus, a dominant rationale for regulation of the employment relationship is the
asserted need to guard against the employer's leveraging of these imbalances to exploit its worker. 196 Statutes and regulations governing
the payment of a minimum wage and overtime compensation and establishing workplace health and safety standards are the paradigmatic examples. 197 In the context of arbitration agreements required
194. See Maureen A. Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute: The Federal Ar·
bitrationAct and Displacement of Agency Regulation, 5 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEnIA1'ION 59,
60 (2013) ("Increasingly, the FAA preemption doctrine is "unworkable" and unnecessarily constrains states' ability to implement public policy.").
195. See e.g., Marion Crain, Arm's-Length Intimacy: Employment as Relationship,
35 WABH. U. J.L. & Pm,'v 163, 166-67 & n.12 (2011).
196. See Stewart J. Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment Law: Reflecting
or Refracting Market Forces?, 76 IND. L.J. 29, 47-48 (2001) (asserting that concerns
with the greater bargaining power enjoyed by employers and the possible exploitation
of workers arising therefrom are the asserted justification for much employment
regulation).
197. See Crain, supra note 195, at 182 (citing the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the Occupational Safety and Health Act as examples of statutes enacted in response

Spring 2015]

FAA Preemption of State Employment Arb

45

as a condition of employment, critics of employment arbitration frequently voice the concern that the employer will use its superior bargaining strength and sophistication to impose upon its worker an
arbitration agreement that might make it more difficult if not impracticable for the worker to vindicate her rights against the employer.198 It is indeed troubling and somewhat ironic that an
employer might use its superior bargaining position to impose upon
its worker an arbitration agreement that would then neuter employment regulation specifically intended to safeguard that worker from
abuses made possible by the employer's bargaining power and informational advantages.199
Critics of consumer arbitration voice similar concerns: a commercial interest may leverage its bargaining and informational advantages to impose upon a consumer a contract of adhesion mandating
an arbitral forum with features that render it impracticable for the
consumer to vindicate her interests in the arbitral forum. 200 As with
critics of employment arbitration, a great concern of critics of consumer arbitration is that arbitration agreements that include a
waiver of any right to bring a class or collective action may leave the
adhering party with no viable means to vindicate small value
claims. 201
to "(t]he potential for the exploitation of less powerful workers in slack labor
markets").
198. See Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of
Statistics in Judicial Revrew of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 223, 240 (1998) (discussing the repeat player advantage in selecting an arbitrator); E. Gary Spitko, Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers from
Legislation Inualidating Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 591, 612-13 (2009) (discussing such concerns). Cf Paul H. Haagen, New
Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration,
40 Amz. L. REV. 1039, 1059--00 (1998) (arguing that public policy supports requiring a
party seeking to impose a "mandatory arbitration" agreement to provide reliable information concerning the choice between arbitration and litigation to the party lacking such information).
199. See In re Poly-America, L.P., Ind., 262 S.W.3d. 337, 352 (Tex. 2008) (making
essentially this point).
200. See Yelnosky, supra note 26, at 736 (asserting that "the major arbitration
issue of our time" is "the imposition on consumers and employees of arbitration agree-

ments that effectively deprive them of the ability to vindicate their federal- or statelaw rights").
201. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules,
87 IND. L.J. 239, 242, 268 (2012) (expressing this concern with respect to the "(t]wo
paradigm examples" of consumer and employment claims 11that cannot feasibly be
brought on an indivjdual basis"); Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 336 (opining that
"class action waivers have become the single most contentious issue surrounding con-

sumer and employment arbitration agreements"); id. at 371; Sarah Rudolph Cole, On
Babres and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court's Recent
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Given the many common criticisms, it should not surprise that
reform proposals targeting the FAA often lump together consumer
arbitration and employment arbitration. 202 Most prominently, the
proposed so-called Arbitration Fairness Act would void predispute arbitration agreements relating to consumer or employment claims. 203
A compelling case can be made, however, that employment law is special in ways that justify a separate regime of employment arbitration
regulation, notwithstanding the merits of arguments for stricter limits on consumer arbitration.
The case for special treatment under the FAA of employment arbitration regulation relies upon interacting private and public interests relating to both individual and group identity and equality. The
argument begins with the proposition that the employment relationship is central to the lives of most workers. First, for most workers,
their employment is critical to maintaining their standard of living.
Moreover, for many workers, their employment is a core aspect of
their self-concept, a central source for fostering emotional and social
connections, and a key variable influencing their standing in the community.204 Professor Marion Crain has captured well the ways in
which work influences self-concept and social standing: "Working
confers self-sufficiency, dignity, standing in society, and membership
in the social structure. Not to work means dependence, failure, declining social status, insecurity, and shame."205
Given the centrality of work in the lives of most workers, many
workers invest substantial human capital in ways that are specific to
their present employer. They specialize within the firm and develop
knowledge, skills, and relationships that the employment market
Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 Rous, L. REV. 457, 464-71 (2011) (arguing that "the
most pressing issue in consumer arbitration, in the wake of recent Supreme Court
decisions, is the lack of a viable forum for consumers ,vith low value claims").
202. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 2, at 760, 781...{;8 (categorizing employment arbitration and consumer arbitration as arbitration "imposed by repeat players on one-shot
players" and calling for a separate federal arbitration act that would govern only arbitration agreements bet\veen such "parties with disparate negotiating incentives");
Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 327 (arguing in favor of "carefully crafted legislation or
administrative regulations limiting or regulating the use of arbitration agreements in
consumer and employment contracts"),
203. See R.R. 1844, S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013); R.R. 1873, S. 987, 112th Cong.
(2011).
204. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112
MICH. L. REV. 225, 238 (2013) (''For the worker, losing one's job can cause one to lose
the means of making a living and obtaining self-respect and respect from the community."); Crain, supra note 195, at 165, 167, 169, 171-72.
205. Crain, supra note 195, at 199.
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outside of the firm may not value highly if at all. 206 Simultaneously,
they and their families set down roots in the community that might
make relocation fOl' new employment opportunities impracticable. 2 0 7
Thus, in making these firm-specific investments of human capital
and community-specific personal commitments, workers lock-themselves in to their present employer in ways that ultimately further
disempower the worker and further enable employer exploitation. 20s
Surveying these typical features of the employment relationship,
Professor Samuel Bagenstos has concluded that "employment practices are particularly likely to implicate issues of social equality and
that, when they do so, the law should presumptively regulate those
practices to remove the most significant threats to" social equality. 209
Specifically, Professor Bagenstos argues that the centrality of employment to a worker's life and the power that an employer and its
supervisors may have over the worker together threaten to establish
and entrench hierarchies of social status separate and apart from inequalities in economic position. 210 He calls, therefore, for apprnpriate
regulation of the employment relationship to minimize the likelihood
that inequalities in economic position will lead to broader hierarchies
that prevent some workers from participating as full and equal members in society and, indeed, so as to promote equality in social relations both within and apart from the employment relationship. 2 11
Turning to the issue of employment arbitration, Professor Bagenstos argues that, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent arbitrationjurisprudence, employment arbitration required as a condition of
employment poses a "quite significant threat" to social equality. 2 1 2

206. Id. at 164, 200.
207. Id. at 164, 200; cf. Naomi Schoenbaum, Mobility Measures, 2012 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1169, 1194, 1209 (2012) (arguing that "there are reasons to believe that information deficits and cogoitive biases lead individuals and employers to underestimate the
costs of mobility under the current regime, limiting their ability to reach welfaremaximizing decisions" and discussing the "underappreciated costs of [worker]
mobility'').
208. Crain, supra note 195, at 199.
209. Bagenstos, supra note 204, at 238; see also id. at 243-73 (expounding on this
argument).
210. Id. at 232, 237, 244.
211. Id. at 236, 243-44; see also Brishen Rogers, Justice at Work: Minimum Wage
Laws and Social Equality, 92 TEx. L. REV. 1543, 1597 (2014) (defending minimum
wage laws on the ground that they "mitigate work-based class and status distinctions
and enhance low-\vage workets' self-respect").

212.

Bagenstos, supra note 204, at 267-69.
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He points out that a worker's ability to hold her employer accountable for violation of her rights is critical to social equality. 2 1a Yet, the
central holdings of Concepcion, if extended to the employment arbitration context, would undermine the ability of a worker to have her
claims against her employer adjudicated. 214 Thus, Professor Bagenstos concludes that, "an extension of the Court's analysis [in Concepcion] to the employment setting would raise serious social equality
concerns." 215

Aside from the impact of the employment relationship on individual well-being and self-concept, employment practices also have long
been critical to the formation and maintenance of social understandings relating to group identities. For example, employment discrimination against African-Americans has long been grounded in and
reinforced the notion that, for biologic or cultural reasons, black
workers have a lesser capacity for certain employment than white
workers. 216 Similarly, employment discrimination against women
has long been grounded in and reinforced the belief that, because of
physiological and emotional differences between men and women,
women are ill-suited to certain "men's work." 217 Moreover, much employment discrimination against gay and lesbian workers is
grounded in and reinforces the social understanding that gay people
are morally and spiritually inferior to straight people and, thus,
openly gay people must be excluded from working in certain role
model occupations. 21s
Government regulation proscribing such employment discrimination is a critical component of efforts to counter these subordinating narratives. 2 19 Anti-discrimination statutes teach that denying a
213. ld. at 264, 268; see also Rogers, supra note 211, at 1575 (arguing that the
statutory ''entitlement [to a minimum \vage] and its accompanying rjght of action alter the p-0wer dynamics between employer and employee" and that "legal rights, particularly rights against private parties, can be an important social basis of selfrespect").
214. See Bagenstos, supra note 204, at 268.
215. ld. at 269.
216. See NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM Is NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 49, 63, 74, 227 (2006).
217. ld. at 125-26, 129.
218. E. Gary Spitko, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Emplayment Discrimination as a Means
for Social Cleansing, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. PoL'Y. J. 179, 186-91 (2012).
219. See, e.g., SAMUEL ESTREICHER & GILLIAN LESTER, EMPLOYMENT. LAW 7 (2008)
(making the point that employment regulation is a means for society to implement its
values); Robert C. Post, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1, 30-,'Jl, 40 (2000) (recognizing that "[t]he dominant conception of American antidiscrimination la\v aspires to suppress categories of
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worker an employment opportunity on the basis of a prohibited characteristic is inconsistent with society's core values. 220 Such anti-discrimination statutes are critical as well to efforts to dismantle
occupational segregation intrinsic to these narratives. 221 An employment arbitration agreement that makes impracticable a worker's efforts to vindicate her rights under such an anti-discrimination
prohibition retards the statute's effectiveness at establishing, maintaining, and strengthening the equality norm as well as countering
the harmful effects of violations of that norm.
In sum, the centrality of the employment relationship to the lives
of workers and the implications of employment practices for social
understandings and realities relating to both individual and group
identity and equality suggest a need for regulation of employment
arbitration quite distinguishable from any need for regulation of consumer arbitration or, for that matter, of franchise arbitration or of
securities arbitration, which like employment arbitration and consumer arbitration frequently are concerns of arbitration critics. 222
Thus, one might reasonably call for special treatment under the FAA
of employment arbitration regulation that would allow states greater
power to ensure that workers may effectively vindicate their unwaivable state statutory rights. This Article turns now to consideration of
how such reform should be structured.
social judgment that are deemed likely to be infected with prejudice" and acknowledging that this dominant conception has "driv[en] important and far-reaching changes
in the social practices of gender and race11 but arguing for a "sociological account" of
antidiscrimination la\V in which antidiscrimination law is understood "as transform-

ing preexisting social practices, such as race or gender, by reconstructing the social
identities of persons"); Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 1033, 1071, 1096 (2009) (discussing the power of civil rights legislation to
reshape public values).
220. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using Law to Make
Social Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 975 (1997) (arguing that, "At least in part
because of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 - the most important statutory embodiment
of the ideal of racial justice - American culture, American government, and the
American people have absorbed the concepts of equality and integration embodied in
the Act as the proper ethical framework for the resolution of issues of race").
221. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discritnination," Accommodation, and
the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 839 (2003) (arguing that
"[a]ntidiscrimination law is best justified as a policy tool that aims to dismantle patterns of group-based social subordination, and that does so principally by integrating
members of previously excluded, socially salient groups throughout important positions in society'').

222. See Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 418 (noting that "more [foreign] jurisdictions deny enforcement to arbitration agreements in employment contracts than in
consumer contracts" and that "[t]his stance reflects, among other things, the perception that employment disputes often implicate fundamental human rights").
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The Structure of Federal Allowance Oversight
1. Too Much Federal Regulation: A General Ban on

Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements
One oft-suggested approach to reform would invalidate predispute employment arbitration agreements generally. Indeed, in recent
years, a number of bills have been introduced in Congress· that to
varying degrees would have invalidated predispute employment arbitration agreements. The most extreme of these bills would have invalidated all predispute employment arbitration agreements. 223
Other bills would have invalidated only predispute arbitration
clauses that required arbitration of employment claims arising under
the Constitution or federal statutes. 224
None of these bills has proven politically viable. 225 In general,
they have been widely criticized as overbroad in their approach to
223. See, e.g., Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 1844, S. 878, 113th Cong.
(2013); Arbitration Fairness Act of2011, H.R. 1873, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, lllth Cong. (2009); Arbitration Fairness Act
of 2009, S. 931, lllth Cong. (2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, S.
1782, llOth Cong. (2007). In recent years, Congress has banned non-negotiable arbi·
tration clauses in a variety of contexts. See Motor Vehicles Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2001) (prohibiting motor vehicle
manufacturers} importers, and distributors from requiring arbitration under their
franchise agreements); Dep't of Def. Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat.
38 § 8102(a)(l).(2) (2011) (prohibiting government contractors from requiring arbitration of Title VII claims or tort claims arising from a sexual assault or harassment);
John Warner Nat'! Def. Authorization Act, 10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3) (2012) (making it
unla,vful for a consumer creditor to require an active duty service me1nber, her
spouse, child, or dependent to submit to arbitration a claim involving the extension of
consumer credit); Food Conservation and Energy Act, 7 U.S.C. § 197c(a)(b) (2012) (allowing an agricultural producer or grower to decline to be bound by an arbitration
provision prior to entering into a livestock or poultry contract); The Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
§§ 748, 921, 1028, 1414 (2010) (banning arbitration agreements with respect to
whistleblower claims on commodities fraud(§ 748) or securities fraud(§ 921), granting the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau the power to prohibit preclispute arbitration provisions in consurner financial products and services contracts (§ 1028),
banning predispute arbitration clauses in residential mortgages and home equity
loans (§ 1414), and authorizing the SEC to prohibit or limit predispute arbitration
agreements between a broker or securities dealer and a customer if the SEC finds
that such regulation would be "in the public interest and for the protection of investors" (§ 921(a))).
224. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 2008, H.R. 5129, S 2554, llOth Cong. § 423
(2008); Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act of 2005, H.R. 2969, 109th Cong.
(2005); Civil Rights Act of 2004, H.R. 3809, S 2088, 108th Cong. § 423 (2004).
225. One might argue, however, that the Department of Defense Appropriations
Act prohibiting government contractors from requiring arbitration of Title VII claims
or tort claims arising from a sexual assault or harassment, see Pub. L. No. 112-10,
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reform. 226 This author has argued elsewhere, for example, that these
attempts at reform fail to appreciate that many of the common concerns respecting employment arbitration and many of the benefits of
employment arbitration do not have equal force across the spectrum
of employees and employers. With respect to enforcement of a predispute employment arbitration agreement, it makes sense to consider,
for example, how the general counsel of Apple Inc. is situated differently as an employee than the worker who cleans her office. It makes
sense also to consider, for example, how Apple Inc. is situated differently as an employe1· than the five-person start-up firm down the
road. Thus, this author has argued, such reforms should exempt from
their scope employment arbitration agreements entered into by certain high-level employees as well as those entered into by relatively
smaller employers.2 2 1
More generally, an FAA amendment that would invalidate all
predispute employment arbitration agreements or even only a subset
of such agreements that relate to claims arising under the Constitution or a federal statute would be fa1· too crude an instrument to address the common concerns with predispute employment arbitration
agreements. As contrasted with litigation, employment arbitration
offers the potential for a more knowledgeable, cost-effective, expeditious, and private adjudication of an employee-employer dispute. 228 A
complete ban on the enforcement of predispute employment arbitration agreements, therefore, would discard the baby with the
bathwater. A more thoughtful and flexible approach is called for.
2.

Too Little Federal Regulation: The Reverse
Preemption Approach

The most flexible approach to reform of the relationship between
the FAA and state regulation of employment arbitration would
amend the FAA to give each state carte blanche to determine the extent to which any predispute employment arbitration agreement may
125 Stat. 38 § 8102(a)(l)--{2) (2011), has gone a long way toward implementing the
goals of these bills related to employment arbitration.
226. See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against
the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 CAJ1oozo J. CONFLICT RllSOL. 267, 269, 281 (2008) (acknowledging that the arbitration system is flawed but criticizing the Arbitration Fairness Act's ~ackhammer approach to arbitration reform"); Stipanowich, supra note 1,
at 400-404. But see Schwartz, supra note 201, at 240 (arguing that "[t]he Arbitration
Faimess Act should be passed because consumer and employment disputes are too
important a henhouse to be governed by contracts written by foxes").
227. See Spitko, supra note 198, at 62~2, 646-49.
228. See id. at 605---08 (discussing the virtues of employment arbitration).
1
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be enforced. Federal law already provides for such a "reverse preemption" approach in the context of insurance regulation: the McCarranFerguson Act ("MFA") provides generally that state law preempts
federal law with respect to the regulation of "the business of insurance" and the interpretation of insurance contracts. Specifically, the
MFA provides that, "No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act
specifically relates to the business ofinsurance." 229 The FAA does not
specifically relate to the business of insurance. Thus, states are free
to regulate arbitration agreements to the extent that the arbitration
regulation relates to the business of insurance. 2 30
In the context of employment arbitration, the reverse preemption
approach would empower each state to tailor its regulation of employment arbitration in light of the peculiarities of the state's employment laws and the specific challenges arbitration might present to a
worker seeking to vindicate her statutory rights arising under those
employment laws. One might expect that even with this authority
some states would take a hands-off approach to the regulation of
predispute employment arbitration agreements in an effort to attract
arbitration business to their jurisdiction.231 Given that most employment arbitration agreements are drafted by employers and imposed
on employees as a condition of employment on an adhesive basis, a
state might seek to attract arbitration business by assuring employers that their employment arbitration agreements will be enforced in
the jurisdiction.
Other states, however, likely would regulate predispute employment arbitration agreements heavily in an effort to safeguard the
public interests that ground their employment laws. The track record
of various states regulating arbitration agreements relating to insurance contracts is instructive. Nearly one-third of the states have statutes that purport to invalidate all or nearly all predispute arbitration
agreements relating to contracts of insurance. 232 A number of state
229. 15 u.s.c. § 1012(b).
230. Notwithstanding the MFA, the states remain subject to constitutional limits
in their regulation of the business of insurance. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S.
869, 881-83 (1985).
231. See generally Erin O'Hara O'Connor & Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration, The
Law Market, and the Law of Lawyering, 38 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 87 (2014) (seeking
to test empirically for effects of jurisdictional competition for domestic arbitration
business).
232. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-108-230; Ga. Code. Ann § 9-9-2; Haw. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 431:10-221; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 5-401; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 417.050; La. Rev.
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and federal courts have held that the MFA allows these states to reverse preempt the FAA to enforce this state statutory law banning
insurance arbitration. 233 Thus, in the employment arbitration context, the concern arises that under the reverse preemption approach
a state may give too little weight to the interest of employers and
employees in realizing the virtues of employment arbitration. Indeed,
California's track record regulating employment arbitration suggests
that the likely result of a reverse preemption approach in California,
and perhaps in other states, would mirror the outcome under the
most extreme legislation that Congress has considered in recent
years respecting predispute employment arbitration agreements - a
blanket invalidation of such agreements.
3. A Compromise Approach: Federal Agency Allowance
Oversight of State Employment Arbitration
Regulation

The optimal approach to reform would accomplish two goals.
First, an optimal approach would provide a meaningful federal safeguard for the interest of employers and employees in realizing the
benefits of employment arbitration. Second, such an approach would
Stat. Ann. § 22:629; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175 § 22; Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 435.350;
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 25-2602.01; Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1855(D); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 15-48-10(b)(4); S.D. Codified Laws § 21-25A-3; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 5653; Va.
Code. Ann. § 38.2-312; Wash. Rev. Code. Ann. § 48.18.200(l)(b); see also State Laws
Regulating Arbitration in Insurance Contracts, PUBLIC CITIZEN (visited Jan. 30, 2014)
http://www.citizen.org/congress/article_redirect.cfm?ID=6560 (listing and describing
various statutes).
233. See e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. James River Ins. Co., 292 P.3d 118, 123-24
(Wash. 2013) (holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act shields a Washington statute
that prohibits arbitration agreements in insurance contracts from FAA preemption);
Love v. Money Tree, Inc., 614 S.E.2d 47, 49-50 (Ga. 2005) (holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act precludes the FAA from preempting a Georgia statue providing
that arbitration agreements relating to contracts of insurance are invalid); Standard
Sec. Life Ins. Co. of New York v. West, 267 F.3d 821, 823 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that
the McCarran-Ferguson Act prevents the FAA from preempting a Missouri statute
invalidating arbitration agreements in insurance contracts); Mut. Reinsurance Bu~
reau v. Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., Inc., 969 F.2d 931, 935 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the McCarran-Ferguson Act precludes the FAA's application to a Kansas statute
invalidating arbitration agreements in insurance contracts); Nat'l Home Ins. Co. v.
King, 291 F. Supp. 2d 518, 530 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (holding that a Kentucky statute providing that arbitration agreements in insurance contracts are not enforceable is ex~
empt from FAA preemption because of the McCarran-Ferguson Act); Am. Health &
Life Ins. Co. v. Heyward, 272 F. Supp. 2d. 578, 583 (D. S.C. 2003) (holding that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act "precludes the application of the FAA to arbitration clauses
contained in insurance policies governed by South Carolina law" which provides that
the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act shall not apply to "any insured or beneficiary under any insurance policy or annuity contract1').
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still allow for full consideration of a state's interest in regulating employment arbitration so as to ensure a worker's ability to effectively
vindicate her state statutory rights and, relatedly, to safeguard the
public policies that ground the state's regulation of the employment
relationship. Accordingly, this Article proposes that Congress amend
the FAA to provide for federal agency allowance oversight of state
regulation of employment arbitration agreements. Specifically, Congress should limit the FAA's preemptive scope by carving out an exception to section 2 that would allow states to regulate predispute
employment arbitration agreements subject to the approval of such
regulation by the U.S. Department of Labor or a similar body. Pursuant to this reform, a state would be authorized to propose employment arbitration regulations tailored to the specifics of that state's
employment statutes. A federal overseer with expertise in employment law would be charged with evaluating any such proposed employment arbitration regulation by balancing the federal interest in
promoting arbitration agreements as written with the state interest
in vindicating state statutory employment rights. The federal overseer could approve the proposed regulations, reject them, or condition
approval on suggested revisions. 234
A model for such federal oversight of state regulation of employment arbitration already exists in the context of securities arbitration.235 Pursuant to that scheme, private professional organizations
called self-regulating organizations ("SRO") have regulated securities
arbitration under the supervision of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"). 236 Previously, multiple SROs maintained their
own rules for arbitrations occurring under their auspices. 237 Nonetheless, prior to 2007, the vast majority of SRO arbitrations were administered by either the National Association of Securities Dealers
234. For a broad discussion of the delegation to federal agencies of the power to
waive federal statutory requirements, including consideration of the constitutionality
and policy implications of such a practice, see David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In
Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2013).
235. See Stipanowich, supra note 1, at 430 (suggesting that "[t]he history of the
evolution of securities arbitration under the auspices of securities self-regulatory or-

ganizations ... demonstrates how a framework that combines active agency oversight
of rulemaking and administration with ongoing active debate between advocates for
investors and brokerage companies can engender a dynamic process that promotes
greater fairness and response to change"); id. at 384.
236. See generally Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. Cm. L. REV. 493, 512-17 (2008).

237. Constantine N. Katsoris, Roadmap to Securities ADR, 11
& Frn. L. 413, 420 (2006).

FORDHAM

J.
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("NASD") or the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). 2 38 In 2007, the
regulatory functions of the NASD and NYSE, including their arbitration departments, merged into the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"). 239 Today, FINRA administers nearly all
arbitrations of securities disputes in the United States. 240
Federal securities law, however, grants the SEC the authority to
oversee SRO rulemaking, including SRO arbitration rulemaking.
Pursuant to section 19(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
the SEC must approve any proposed SRO arbitration rule change
before the rule change may go into effect. 241 An SRO request for a
rule change is first published in the Federal Register and becomes
subject to public comment. Before approving any such proposed
change, the SEC must first determine that the change is consistent
with the requirements of the Exchange Act and the rules and regulations enacted thereunder and, accordingly, protects investors and is
in the public interest. 242 The SEC has often required changes in proposed SRO securities arbitration rules in light of concerns raised in
the public comment process.2 4 3
A similar federal allowance oversight scheme relating to state
regulation of employment arbitration would moderate the extreme
features embedded in the post-Concepcion, post-Italian Colors Restaurant status quo. Under such a scheme, federal arbitration law
would no longer be indifferent to the undermining effects that an arbitration agreement may have on state public policies. Rather, the
federal overseer would be specifically charged with considering such
state interests. Moreover, under such a scheme, states would have an
incentive to craft moderate arbitration doctrines that accommodate
rather than foreclose employment arbitration. In sum, compared to
the status quo, a federal allowance oversight scheme would be a more
flexible and more thoughtful means for protecting the workplace-related interests of the state and the interests of workers and employers who have entered into employment arbitration agreements.
238. See id. at 525-134 (setting out the number of arbitrations administered by
various SROs for each year from 1980 through 2005); Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitrators Do Not Grow on Trees, 14 FoRDHM! J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 49, 62 (2008)
(noting that more than 99 percent of the arbitration cases reported filed by the SROs
in 2005 were administered by the NASD or NYSE).
239. Katsot'is, supra note 238, at 62-63.
240. See id. at 64 (noting that "the consolidation of the NASD and NYSE arbitration programs basically left FINRA as the sole provider of an SRO forum for the resolution of securities disputes")
241. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(l) (2006).
242. Id. § 78s(b)(2).

243. Gross, supra note 236, at 515-17.
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Federal allowance oversight with respect to a state statute that
would regulate employment arbitration would begin with a request
from the state legislature that the federal overseer authorize the employment arbitration regulation at issue. In the case of a common law
judicial doctrine, the request would come from the state high court.
In either case, the state would certify the question to the federal overseer in much the same way as a federal court certifies a question of
state law to a state high court. 2 4 4 The request might be made either
at the time of the employment arbitration regulation's promulgation
or at the time when a court seeks to apply the regulation in such a
way that the regulation would impact the enforcement of an employment arbitration agreement.
An existing agency or set of agencies within the U.S. Department
of Labor sensibly might serve as the federal overseer. Alternatively,
the overseer might be a newly created entity situated within the Department of Labor. The Department of Labor would seem an ideal
location for the oversight task given that the department has situated
within it expertise with respect to a wide range of workplace rights from wage and hour law to workers' leave to nondiscrimination
mandates.
Once the state legislature or high court seeks allowance from the
federal overseer, the overseer would publish the proposed state employment arbitration regulation in the Federal Register and would
seek public comment on the regulation. In considering whether to approve the state employment arbitration regulation, the overseer
would balance the state's asserted interests in regulating employment arbitration against the federal interest in the enforcement of
employment arbitration agreements as written. The overseer would
then reject the regulation as applied to arbitration contracts within
the FAA's purview, accept the regulation, or condition approval on
proposed changes to the regulation.
The federal allowance oversight scheme should be structured to
minimize two potential drawbacks. One concern is that the federal
allowance oversight scheme might delay the start of arbitration for
parties to an employment arbitration contract subject to regulation
under the scheme. A second concern is that the federal allowance
oversight scheme might result in increased costs to such parties.
244. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011) (certifying a question to the Supreme Court of California); Cal. R. Ct. 8.548 (providing a
mechanism for the Supreme Court of California to decide a question of California law
upon a request from the United States Supreme Court, a United States Court of Appeals) or a state's court of last resort).
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Qjven that a common motivation for entering into an employment arbitration contract is to realize a more expeditious and less expensive
dispute resolution process, delays and costs arising from the scheme
should be kept to a minimum.
To minimize delays in the parties getting to arbitration, state
legislation impacting employment arbitration should not take effect
until the federal overseer has approved the legislation. Thus, when
the state employment arbitration regulation at issue arises from a
state statute, the federal allowance oversight scheme would not give
rise to any delay in getting to arbitration. To minimize delays associated with federal allowance oversight of state employment ai·bitration regulation arising from common law, the scheme should provide
for an aggressive timetable for state submission of the doctrine to the
federal overseer for approval, for publication in the Federal Register,
for notice and comment, and for final federal overseer action with respect to the doctrine.
As is the case with federal regulation of securities arbitration,
the monetary costs of federal allowance oversight of state employment arbitration regulation are likely to be substantial. 245 It is critical that the parties to an employment arbitration agreement who
become involved with the scheme not be asked to shoulder any of the
direct costs. Imposing such costs on the parties to an employment arbitration agreement would significantly disadvantage arbitration.
Rather, the state that seeks to safeguard the public interests implicated by its employment regulation and the federal government that
seeks to promote the federal interest in the enforcement of employment arbitration agreements should shoulder these costs.
To more fully appreciate how the proposed scheme might work,
its potential virtues, and its potential vices, it is useful to consider a
concrete example. Recall, for this purpose, the statute at issue in
Perry v. Thomas. 246 The statute at issue there, section 229 of the California Labor Code, provided that a worker could maintain in court
an action for the collection of wages due even if the worker had entered into an arbitration agreement the scope of which encompassed
the worker's claim.247

245. See Stipanowich, s1tpra note 1, at 430 (noting that federal regulation of the
securities industry "entail[s] significant costs, much of whlch today is borne by the
securities industry").

246. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
247. Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 229.
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Federal allowance oversight of section 229 might profitably be
contrasted with the Supreme Court's consideration of the same employment arbitration regulation in Perry. In holding that the FAA
preempted section 229, the Court focused solely on the "liberal policy
favoring arbitration agreements." 248 The Court gave little consideration to Thomas's argument that California's interest in protecting its
workers outweighed the federal interest in the enforcement of arbitration agreements. 249 Indeed, one cannot even discern from the
Court's opinion in Perry what those specific state interests were. 250
Under the proposed federal allowance scheme, however, California's
interests would be at the center of the preemption analysis.
At the same time, the broad sweep of section 229 suggests that
the California legislature gave little consideration in enacting the
employment arbitration regulation to the federal interest favoring arbitration agreements. Had it done so, it might have crafted a more
narrow exception to the enforcement of employment arbitration
agreements. For example, California might have invalidated only arbitration agreements that failed to ensure certain procedural protections to workers bringing claims for wages owed or might have
required a judicial forum only for certain small value claims. The proposed federal allowance oversight scheme would give state legislatures an incentive to take a more thoughtful approach to employment
arbitration regulation in the hope that the federal overseer would approve the more narrowly tailored exception.
Finally, the federal allowance oversight scheme should promote
greater certainty with respect to the enforcement of employment arbitration agreements. Under the proposed scheme, no state regulation of employment arbitration would become operative until the
federal overseer had approved its application. Thus, the proposed
scheme should go a long way toward ending the game of preemption
chess - with the parties to employment arbitration agreements as
its pawns - that characterizes the status quo. 2 51
248. Perry, 482 U.S. at 489.
249. See id. at 486, 489.
250. Cf. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 131
(1973) (speculating, despite the "sparse" legislative history, that section 229 "was due,
apparently, to the legislature's desire to protect the worker from the exploitative employer who would demand that a prospective employee sign away in advance his right
to resort to the judicial system for redress of an employment grievance))).
251. Cf. Stipanowich supra note 1, at 428-29 (arguing that judicial application of
uncoriscionability doctrine in the arbitration context gives rise to uncertainty and
that statutory due process standards for arbitration would alleviate this problem).
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CONCLUSION

An employer's workplace practices may impact not only its
worker's economic well-being but also her self-concept and social
standing. Indeed, employment practices may have profound implications for a worker's social equality and, thus, her ability to participate as a full and equal citizen in society. Employment practices also
may help form and maintain social understandings and realities relating to group identity and equality. Thus, state regulation of the
employment relationship implicates not only private interests but
also significant public policies and public interests relating to individual and group identity and equality.
Employment arbitration has the potential to undermine these
important public policies and public interests. Employer bargaining
power and informational advantages rafae the prospect of an employer imposing on its employee as a condition of employment an arbitration agreement that may impair the ability of the worker to
vindicate her unwaivable state statutory employment rights. The arbitration agreement that impairs a worker's ability to effectively vindicate her state statutory employment rights simultaneously
imperils the state public policies and public interests that ground
those rights. Thus, the state has a strong interest in regulating
predispute employment arbitration agreements so as to ensure that
its workers may effectively vindicate their unwaivable state statutory
employment rights.
The U.S. Supreme Court's recent FAA jurisprudence makes
clear, however, that a state's public policy reasons for regulating employment arbitration are irrelevant to FAA preemption analysis. Indeed, the Court's most recent FAA jurisprudence obliterates the state
. effective-vindication exception and with it the state employment arbitration regulation that relies upon the exception. Thus, this jurisprudence impairs the ability of states to regulate employment
arbitration so as to safeguard the public policies and public interests
that ground state regulation of the employment relationship.
This Article proposes an amendment to the FAA that would place
the state public policies and public interests that ground regulation of
the employment relationship at the center of FAA preemption analysis. In so doing, however, this Article rejects an approach that would
give states carte blanche to regulate employment arbitration. Such
an approach would likely result in regulation that undervalues the
virtues of employment arbitration and, thus, gives insufficient weight
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to the interest of employers and employees in the enforcement of employment arbitration agreements. Rather, this Article proposes a
middle-of-the-road approach that combines a federal openness to consider state interests in regulating employment arbitration with a federal check on such state regulation focused on protecting the interest
of employers and employees in the enforcement of predispute employment arbitration agreements.

